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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to challenge the universalistic concept of 
citizenship. Throughout the thesis it will be argued that citizenship is a multi-
faceted concept irreducible to a singular explanation. Arguably, the universal 
nature of citizenship has been called into question by the process of 
globalisation from 'above' and by regionalism from 'below'. 
However, the belief that the nation-state is moribund is a fallacious 
assumption, and it will be shown that although the power of the nation-state 
has indeed been curbed - through, for example, the activities of 
'Transnational Corporations' and 'Global Communications Networks' - it is still 
a key player in determining citizenship rights. To consider the nation-state to 
be irrelevant is to undermine the strong psychological influence it still exerts. 
Nevertheless, citizenship must begin to look beyond the universal 
to the particular, and begin to encompass the notion of 'difference', as 
arguably citizenship as well as being a legal status is also a source of identity. 
In its present state, citizenship is militating against certain groups, and if 
harmony is to be maintained within society then citizenship must be an 
inclusive category. 
This thesis does not pretend to provide the definitive answer to 
'what is a citizen', it is an exploration of a highly complex concept, which is not 
reducible to one snappy sound-bite. However, ultimately, because of the 
complex nature of citizenship, there must be a reconsideration of the 
universality of citizenship, and 'difference' must be encompassed to fit with the 
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Of late, the concept of citizenship has been 
amongst the key political debates, with politicians from all parts of the 
political spectrum claiming they have the definitive answer to 'what is a 
citizen', and what is the 'role of a citizen'? 
However the notion of citizenship is not only 
confined to the realm of the politician, but has now become the topic of 
discussion amongst academics, (Kymlicka & Norman: 1994, 
Dahrendorf: 1996, Roche: 1992). The philosophical musing of 
academics about what constitutes a citizen seems to be fairly 
inconsequential when dealing with day to day issues, though 
realistically nothing could be further from the truth. Day to day 
experiences are altered according to whether we are afforded 
citizenship status or not. 
Considering the abundance of debates 
surrounding citizenship, such as do individuals have to perform duties 
as well as being claimers of 'rights'? are we, for example, in Britain , 
citizens of the United Kingdom alone, or of a greater unit such as 
Europe? Does being a citizen imply we have equality before the law, or 
is it the case that the old adage of some being more equal thfat others 
applies? All these questions impact upon our lives, and also show the 
true nature of citizenship, that it is multi-faceted and problematic to 
define. 
This thesis will therefore examine the 
difficulties encountered by attempting to retain a universal concept of 
citizenship in modern society, and will argue that it is only by analysing 
the many facets of citizenship - how notions of citizenship have been 
affected by globalisation, how new issues of nationality and belonging 
affect the whole debate, and finally how the changing position of 
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women has encouraged new definitions of what it means to be a 
'citizen' - that we can arrive at a fuller understanding of the multi-faceted 
nature of the term. 
There is little consensus amongst academics 
as to which 'realm' the citizen should belong. Some say the citizen 
should be active and responsible to an autonomous region, though the 
devolution debate is hotly contested between those who want to see 
regions independent of the nation-state, (Tassin: 1992, Salmond: 1997), 
and those who believe that the citizen will be best served by the 
regional bodies that remain within the remit of the nation-state, (Healey: 
1996, Mulgan: 1996). There are other commentators who would argue 
that the nature of citizenship should be firmly anchored within the 
nation-state as a whole, (Thatcher: 1993), whilst others proffer evidence 
of the nation-state being in decline, and therefore citizenship should be 
defined in supra-national terms, such as citizenship of the European 
Union, (Tindale: 1996, Meehan: 1993). To add to the profusion of 
arguments, there is also the debate about whether citizenship is 
entering a 'post-national' phase, which even renders supra-national 
identity as obsolete, with citizenship being found not within a territorially 
defined sphere, but being attached to individuals under the auspices of 
human, rights, (Soysal: 1996), and of course intersecting all these 
debates are concerns of class, gender and race. 
This thesis will therefore begin by examining 
some of the history behind citizenship. The debate will commence with 
an examination of Greek citizenship, in particular the work of Aristotle, 
as arguably, his work on citizenship can be described as seminal. The 
discussion will then leap forward to consider the beginning of the 
modem concept of citizenship, that being the 'liberal tradition'. It is not 
the intention to negate the importance of the period between Greek 
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citizenship and the 'liberal tradition', especially the period of Roman 
citizenship, but space does not permit anything but the briefest foray 
into the ancient roots of the idea. The impact of the 'three revolutions' as 
Roche (1996) describes the upheavals in France, USA and England, 
will be discussed to assess their impact on how the three countries 
have developed varying styles of citizenship. The three philosophers 
connected mostly with the varying models of citizenship, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu and Locke will be examined. 
considered, that is, how citizenshipj^etame to encompass social rights 
along with civil and political rights. Again, whilst acknowledging the 
contributions of earlier authors, the debate must move swiftly to more 
modern influences, in particular the work of T H Marshall and how he 
perceived citizenship as a universal condition. There is currently a 
debate raging as to whether social citizenship has created a dependent 
client group, where citizenship is not an Aristotelian ideal of civic duty, 
but has been aligned consistently with the notion of entitlement. 
Therefore the chapter will conclude with a discussion about whether this 
is really the case, or perhaps we are now experiencing a true 
Marshallian concept of citizenship, where the burden of social care is 
considered not to be primarily the burden of the state, and that 
assistance should come from other sources such as voluntary 
agencies, family and community as well as the state. 
globalisation on citizenship, and how the process of globalisation has 
undermined the notion of universality. It will be argued that globalisation 
has fragmented societies, and this has created the conditions for 
considering notions of 'difference'. The chapter will begin by defining 
what is meant by 'globalisation', as the concept of globalisation 
The evolution of citizenship will then be 
Chapter two, will then consider the impact of 
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sometimes does seem to be much used but seldom defined, with 
commentators such as Hutton (1997) describing the term as the new 
'buzzword'. Two key issues of globalisation, the activities of 
Transnational Corporations (TNC's) and global communications will be 
examined to asses their impact on citizenship. The final discussion in 
this chapter will centre around whether in the face of globalisation, the 
nation-state can be the custodian of citizenship rights. The aspect of 
human rights will be explored and it will be queried whether we have 
really reached a stage where human rights supersede citizenship rights, 
and whether citizenship is truly in a 'post-national' phase. 
Chapter three, will look specifically at the 
European issue and citizenship and how the issue of who can rightly 
claim to be a member of a European country, has seemingly sparked 
some of our worst traits of petty nationalism. How citizenship has 
normally been defined within the member states will be considered, so 
the reader has at least some knowledge of how history has informed 
the current debates. It is within this section that the debate concerning 
regional citizenship will be explored. In particular the work of Tassin 
(1992) will be examined, as thus far, research carried out for this thesis, 
has revealed that he has proffered some of the most radical arguments 
for developing autonomous regional bodies. 
The European issue has arguably brought 
notions of 'difference' to the fore. Each layer of society from sub to 
supra has a different expectation of citizenship. Therefore this chapter 
will also discuss whether the three 'tiers' of government, sub, national 
and supra can ever be reconciled, and the needs of the various levels 
be articulated harmoniously, rather that what appears to be at present, 
a purely antagonistic relationship between the three. Therefore, there 
will be an examination of what the three tiers can 'offer', the supra-
national body can offer protection in the form of the 'Social Charter', and 
the sub-national can provide a more intimate bond, therefore it is 
envisaged that the nation-state will be used because it has a strong 
psychological link with people, and also it can act as a mediator 
between supra-national and sub-national to oversee the equitable 
distribution of resources. 
Chapter four will deal specifically with feminism 
and citizenship. The rationale behind keeping women and citizenship as 
a subject for discussion on its own, is that it will be shown how many 
feminist writers believe that women are not being afforded equal rights 
to men, and under the current regime of liberal democracy probably 
never will. Thus this chapter will further consider the notion of 
'difference', and how within feminism there are even different theories 
about 'difference'. Alternate strategies will be discussed to see whether 
a more equitable citizenship can be reached, one which encompasses 
the notion of 'difference' rather than universality. 
Whilst not wishing to labour the remark, the 
aim of this thesis is to consider the facets of citizenship, and how 
citizenship is informed by debates as varied as globalisation to 
feminism. Therefore this work should be considered as a challenge to 
the notipn of universality, almost a journey, exploring the term rather 




Aristotle to Present 
Examining the History of the Citizenship Debate 
Debates on citizenship have raged through the 
centuries, though some would argue that the genesis of citizenship 
began in the Greek Polis, (Oliver & Heater: 1994, Heater: 1990, 
Manville: 1990). Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of 
citizenship as now known, it is essential the historical roots of the 
debates about citizenship are explored. If as stated earlier, citizenship 
began with the Greeks, then the starting point of this discussion will be 
the thoughts and works of Aristotle, as he has been described as being, 
"ranked amongst the greatest works of political philosophy... No 
philosophy before Aristotle has attempted to provide such a coherent 
and systematic study of the science of politics", (Everson, 1992, pix), 
For Aristotle, citizenship is about exclusion. 
Slaves, for example were not given citizenship, as they were thought to 
be incapable of exercising any power of free choice or of making 
rational decisions. The ability to make rational decisions was important 
to Aristotle, as ultimately he likened irrational behaviour to that of 
animals, who did not have the power to reason. Citizens needed to 
have the power of reason as this meant that the excesses of nature 
were held in check, leading to harmony within the polis, where each 
citizen worked and acted for the good of others, (Manville: 1990, 
Russell: 1991). 
Women and children were also excluded from 
full citizenship. Aristotle believed that women were hindered by their 
own biological make-up, their power to exercise any form of rationality 
being thwarted by their own bodies, (De Beauvoir: 1988). Women and 
children were given protection under the law, but were not allowed to 
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own property. Their relationship to the polis was via their male protector 
who could be a husband, father or other male relative. It is this sort of 
exclusion which marks Aristotle's work. Of slaves he states, "the 
master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, 
whereas the slave is not only the slave of the master, but wholly 
belongs to him", (Everson, 1992 p6), and of women and children "a 
husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but 
the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a 
constitutional rule", (Everson, 1992, p17). 
Citizenship was awarded to men on the 
grounds of 'jus soli'. This means that in order to be granted the status of 
citizenship within the polis, a person had to be born in the polis. 
However in order to participate in the running of the polis, even 
Athenian males had to satisfy further obligations. They had to own 
property. Property ownership inferred a good solid character, (Oliver & 
Heater: 1994) 
The cornerstone of Aristotle's polis, must be 
that the citizens shared an identity - albeit an elite exclusive one. They 
understood the laws and regulations of the polis, and by virtue of their 
moral and ethical code, were willing to abide by them. In effect then as 
Manville, states, 
"the polis of citizens requires a formal standard to distinguish 
who is a member and who is not. In other words, if set criteria 
for membership in the polis are lacking, the polis itself lacks 
identity... Aristotle's criteria for citizenship still points to the 
need for a fixed standard; there must be agreed upon rules 
(or laws) to determine who can and who cannot participate in 
the deliberative and judicial decisions", (1990: 40). 
By understanding the regulatory codes of the 
polis, and by sharing a collective identity, it was hoped that harmony 
would be maintained. Aristotle believed men should work towards a 
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state of happiness, the citizen body should strive to reach this state by 
using moral, intellectual and ethical reasoning. Aristotle, it is thought, 
believed "by being compelled to acquire good habits we shall in time... 
come to find pleasure in performing good actions, (Russell, 1991, 
p185). Therefore, Aristotle's citizens were not 'rights' claimers, but were 
actively engaged in working for the good of the community. 
The state of citizenship proposed by Aristotle 
was based on a strict social hierarchy, and on rigid boundaries of 
exclusion. Citizenship was therefore a much prized status, only 
available to a select few. Indeed when Aristotle discusses democracy in 
Book vi of Politics, he always links democracy with citizenship. Aristotle 
does seem to believe that all citizens should be treated equally, and that 
the will of the majority will always take precedent over the minority, he 
also states that citizens should have a right to vote irrespective of 
whether they are rich or poor, as stated, 
"democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon 
the recognised principle of democratic justice, that all should 
count equally, for equality implies that the poor should have 
no more share in the government than the rich", (Everson, 
1992, p145). 
However, Aristotle does make a distinction 
between Athenian democracy, where everyone is afforded equality as 
long as they are a citizen, and what he describes as "extreme 
democracy", (Everson, 1992, p57), where the master learns the crafts 
of the "working classes", (Everson, 1992, p57). 
This distinction is extremely important and 
axiomatic to the concept of Athenian citizenship. Democracy to Aristotle 
is only available for the select few upon whom citizenship has been 
conferred, the Athenian property owning male. Aristotle did not want 
'extreme democracy' as this would dilute the hierarchy upon which 
Athenian citizenship was decided, the rigid class distinction between 
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free men and slaves, as Aristotle states if 'extreme democracy' was in 
operation then "there will cease to be a distinction between master and 
slave", (Everson, 1992, p57). 
So to sum up , citizenship was a status 
enjoyed by an elite few. Women enjoyed certain privileges through their 
attachment to men, whilst foreigners only acquired certain rights, 
through their attachment to a sponsor, whilst slaves had no rights at all, 
being wholly owned by their masters. The good citizen was therefore a 
property owning native born male, willing to strive to reach a state of 
excellence in matters of intellectual, moral and ethical, so he could 
serve the Athenian community. He was not a rights claimer, but was 
duty bound to serve his fellow citizens, (Selbourne: 1994, Trigg: 1993). 
Citizenship and the Libera] Tradition 
Citizenship during the period of the Greek City 
States was relatively easy to define, as the parameters were clearly 
marked, the City States were also small and manageable. With the 
onset of capitalism, the notion of citizenship became immediately more 
complex. The advent of the nation-state seemingly linked citizenship 
with national boundaries. Arguably, capitalism also heralded perhaps 
the biggest intellectual challenge for citizenship - the 'liberal tradition'. 
This concept pushed the boundaries of citizenship away from an 
association with the performance of duties, towards an association with 
entitlement to receive civil and political rights, though it must be noted 
that this did still exclude many - citizenship, for example, not being 
extended to women. 
The advent of capitalism also called into 
question the validity of the notion of the 'Divine Right' of the monarchy. 
The reigning sovereign still had the Royal Prerogative and could 
constantly undermine the wishes of Parliament. However by this time, 
Parliament was made up of amongst others, industrialists and others 
well versed in domestic and foreign policy. 
Thus it was the case, that the men of money -
although owning land and having status and prestige - still did not have 
any real rights of citizenship. They could still be dealt with arbitrarily 
according to the whimsical fancies of the monarch. There needed to be 
a contractual relationship between the governed and the governors. As 
Roche states, 
"the practical emergence of modern understandings of 
citizenship in the West was associated particularly with the 
advent of capitalism and of centralised nation-states in the 
sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. Citizenship was finally 
given voice as a massively influential political concept in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the world-historical 
events of the English, American and French revolutions", 
(1996: 16/17). 
However, although Roche mentions the three 
revolutions together, apropos citizenship, there were some very differing 
ideas. The English citizen always equated itself with the propertied 
classes. As Hill (1963) states, "when members of parliament spoke in 
defence of 'liberty and property', they meant something more like 
•privilege and property' than is conveyed by the modern sense of the 
word liberty", ( 1963: 38). Therefore like the citizens discussed by 
Aristotle, citizenship for the English remained a privilege enjoyed by an 
elite few. By contrast French citizenship was based on liberty, equality 
and fraternity', the qualities held by the person and not imbibed in 
property ownership. As Maclver states, "liberty, equality and fraternity 
were watchwords liable to diverse and dubious interpretations, but 
whatever else they implied they clearly stated that personality and not 
property was the true basis of representation", (1966: 144). This was 
significant as pre-revolutionary France, which theoretically dicj (lave a 
10 
concept of citizenship, was more likely to grant citizenship in "an ad-hoc 
manner in particular cases to make it accord with legal requirements 
about inheritance rights", (Brubaker, 1994, p39). France was riddled 
with a growing disaffection for the ruling aristocratic class and an 
immigration policy which was considered ill defined and unfair, 
(Brubaker: 1994). 
Some commentators argue that Rousseau's 
philosophy influenced how the French constructed their 'model' of 
citizenship (Oliver & Heater: 1994, Russell: 1991), whilst the Americans 
favoured the philosophy of Montesquieu (Heater: 1990). In order to 
understand more clearly the complex nature of citizenship, and 
particularly how difficult it is to discover an agreed definition 
transcending spatial and historical boundaries, we will consider the 
influential work of Rousseau and Montesquieu in the development of 
citizen identity in post-revolutionary France and America. 
Rousseau's main philosophy and belief about 
human nature was that the individual was naturally good, but had 
become corrupted by society. Society for Rousseau, had created a 
situation where man could only form an identity in relation to others, he 
had lost the ability to exercise free will. Man was filled with the desire 
constantly to acquire what others had, this desire often outstripping the 
power to achieve greater power, wealth and so on, consequently, 
leaving him in a state of wretchedness. 
Rousseau believed that, although man could 
not change the fact that he was a social being thus unable to exercise 
purely his individual will, he maintained the belief that individuals could 
achieve some form of internal harmony by realising that all actions had 
consequences. The 'doer' of a particular deed is answerable for the 
outcome and consequences of his actions. 
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Citizenship for Rousseau, was therefore about 
every man participating, and every man being bound by the same laws. 
Rousseau advocated the construction of a constitution, one which had 
been agreed upon by the whole citizen body. In Rousseau's society, 
every man is equal. As Oldfield states, 
"as citizen, he is the equal of his fellows; as a body, they 
collectively determine the laws they are going to live under 
and acknowledge in obligation to obey... They achieve both 
civil and moral liberty and, in the process render themselves 
once more whole, but this time as morally autonomous 
beings", (1990: 75). 
The genesis of the concept of 'liberty, equality 
and fraternity' as a political idea, can be seen as a coherent thread 
running through the philosophy of Rousseau. Meanwhile much the 
same can be said of Montesquieu's influence on the 'Founding 
Fathers' of America. 
Montesquieu, believed in the idea of civic virtue 
- man should exercise moral power over his own urges for the good of 
others. Here individual and common good are intrinsically linked. 
However, the idea of civic virtue was according to Montesquieu really 
only able to function in the smaller city states known in history, as these 
units were considered to be the only places sufficiently intimate in order 
for one to appreciate and understand, that individual good does share a 
symbiotic relationship with collective good. For Montesquieu, individual 
and collective good existed in its purest form within the realms of the 
aristocracy. As Bellah et al state, 
"for a specialised ruling group, an aristocracy, this conjunction 
of private and public identity is, other things being equal, more 
likely than it is in a democracy whose citizens spend most of 
their time in private affairs, taking part in government only 
part-time", (1985: 255). 
Montesquieu's notion of civic virtue was 
accepted by those who were attempting to form the American 
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Constitution, excepting they had to somehow merge the ideals of civic 
virtue into an accepted working model for a burgeoning capitalist 
society. The 'Founding Fathers' therefore attempted to build on the ideal 
of 'goodness', linking it with merit, they hoped to replace the aristocracy 
with meritocracy, where people who deserved success got it and those 
who deserved to run the country were elected to office. 
The ideal of civic virtue, as stated earlier, had 
to be adapted, for the new American Republic was a far different animal 
to the Greek city state. Americans, unlike the Greeks, prized liberty and 
freedom of will, believing that the individual was free to perform duties 
for others, only when his own needs and desires were satiated. For 
America, the ideal of freedom and individual rights has to be tempered 
with duty. It was Tocqueville who transformed Montesquieu's concept of 
civic virtue into 'enlightened self-interest'. Tocqueville argued that 
Americans were not particularly interested in being good and virtuous, 
but agreed that being a reasonably dutiful citizen was useful in that it 
ordered society, keeping it peaceful. Perhaps then the strong individual 
identity of the American was actually being given credence and 
sanctioned at this point. 
Perhaps the most influential British writer on 
liberalism's concept of citizenship is John Locke. Locke believed that in 
the state of nature man is free, and that men are equal. He rejected the 
notion of divine right, but argued that while men are born free and 
equal, each individual has a responsibility not to let his actions impinge 
upon the liberty of others. Locke, therefore, proposed that it was every 
man's duty to control his own behaviour so as not to affect the next 
man. If this could not be done voluntarily, and Locke believed such 
harmony could not be achieved by voluntary action alone, because the 
state of nature is too unstable, then he proposed that men should affect 
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a way in which laws can be made to temper behaviour. Locke proposed 
a 'social contract', where a civil society is propagated and the rights of 
citizens are protected by those governing, but should those governing 
ever break the conditions where the rights of citizens are endangered, 
then the government can be disposed of and a new government can be 
elected, (Seliger: 1968). 
Locke also believed that the ownership of 
property was of paramount importance. He linked the idea of property 
ownership with the idea of justice, he stated "where there is no property, 
there is no justice", (cited in Russell, 1991, p594). Locke persistently 
* demonstrated that the key to freedom was ownership of property and 
that no authority should be able to take away a man's property without 
consent, as one commentator states, Locke perceived "private property 
as the epitome of the individual rights consecrated by the law of nature, 
which is the law of reason and of God", (Seliger, 1968, p18). 
In summary, the differences between the three 
theorists are quite marked. Rousseau believed that it is the duty of 
every man to participate in public life, and that the whole of society 
should be bound by the same laws. Montesquieu held the view that 
citizenship was linked to the notion of civic duty, and it was the case 
that the aristocracy were in a better position to perform their civic 
duties. The American people, whilst accepting the basic tenets of 
Montesquieu's philosophy had to somehow adapt it to their needs. They 
bonded the notion of civic duty to merit and thus replaced an aristocratic 
conception of society with a meritocratic conception. Whilst Locke, 
believing all men are born free and equal, maintained that it was 
everyman's duty to act in a way that did not impinge upon another 
man's freedom. 
14 
The B®v®bQpm@nt of SoeiaD Citizenship 
As it has been shown, political and civil 
citizenship had become to be a subject of debate during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though it must be noted, that 
although citizenship was, as Roche has already stated, "a massively 
influential political concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", 
(1992, 16/17), there was little consensus about the role. To an 
Englishman, citizenship was a status conferred on those with land; it 
was ultimately there to give those with economic interests a voice in 
parliament. In France citizenship was about freedom and equality, their 
society was ordered on citizens being caring social beings, whilst the 
American citizen was accepted as being someone with sufficient 
freedom to pursue their own goals. One thing they did all share was that 
citizenship was not a status given to women, this will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. 
It has been argued, certainly by commentators 
such as Marshall, that political and civil citizenship emerged during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whilst social citizenship was a 
feature of twentieth century society. Whilst doubting the veracity of any 
claim which can so neatly sub-divide such a complex issue, Marshall's 
divisions do allow for the scrutinisation of citizenship, a condition he 
believed to be of universal importance. The bulk of this chapter so far 
has indeed considered the evolution of political and civil rights, so it is 
now an important time to consider social citizenship, and in particular 
the impact of the welfare state 
The most significant event in the evolution of 
social citizenship, certainly within this country, was the introduction of 
the welfare state, this compounded the idea that full citizenship was 
linked with social rights. The right to receive benefits - and by benefits it 
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is not to be thought of simply as social security benefits, but the benefit 
of receiving education and housing - was made possible by the 
reciprocal agreement of others to pay taxes. Marshall believed that the 
welfare state would address issues such as poverty and inadequate 
health care, and would give people the right to a decent standard of 
living, or at least a standard equal to the rest of society. However in 
practice, the welfare state was never meant to equalise society, but to 
equalise within a person's class (Marquand:1988). The right to welfare 
benefits was largely restricted to those who had contributed to the 
system. Buttressing the whole concept of the welfare state was the 
need to maintain full employment, the system was based upon the male 
breadwinner supporting his wife and family. Non-contributory benefits 
for those who had paid the" relevant National Insurance Contributions 
were there as a safety net only, and were not meant to be paid for any 
substantial length of time (Marquand : 1988). 
The immediate post-war economy was 
sufficiently capable of maintaining full employment, and indeed for many 
this was 'boom' time for Britain. Jobs for men were plentiful and strong 
trade unions meant the working man had adequate resources to 
negotiate sound wage settlements. However, the right to benefit was 
still intrinsically linked with the right to work. Non-contributory benefits 
were paid, but to a greater degree the recipients of the non-contributory 
benefits were met with disdain, the old divisions between worthy and 
non worthy poor still remained. As Titmuss states, 
"Many of the services which were born in this period -
perhaps the most formative period in the evolution of the 
British social services - had their character moulded by the 
moral assumptions of the nineteenth century" (1974: 18) 
Despite the emergence of a fully-fledged 
welfare state, it was hoped that the new arrangements would not erode 
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'neighbourliness', or damage the role of family and volunteer workers 
as providers of assistance. Yet as the welfare state developed, it 
became clear that the public realm was encroaching on the private. As 
Roche states, "the combined effects of state organised and market 
based insurance were already, by the late 1940's, fundamentally and 
fatally undermining the previously important role of voluntary action in 
the provision of welfare", (1992: 27). 
This process had the effect of linking 
citizenship, not with duty but with rights and entitlements, (Etzioni: 
1995), a feature which was to have severe consequences as 
unemployment rose during the 1970's and 1980's. Hutton has pointed to 
the "segmentation of the labour market", (1995: 10), and there now 
exists what has been coined as the 'dual labour market', where there is 
an increasingly clear divide between those in low paid and insecure 
employment and those in better paid secure work. Unemployment 
obviously increases demand for welfare, but low pay can have similar 
effects, as it has consequences for 'top up' benefits such as Family 
Credit. 
So the client group originally considered to 
require benefit has changed from those needing short-term assistance 
for periods of short term unemployment, to people needing, for various 
reasons, long term assistance. The changes in the client groups did 
bring about some changes in attitude. It was no longer considered a 
deviant act to be unemployed or requiring assistance over long periods 
of time (Campbell: 1992). Therefore in Britain citizenship means equal 
access to the benefits offered by the welfare state. However during the 
1990's the situation has begun to change, with citizenship once again 
being openly discussed. The debates surrounding citizenship are 
seemingly, though not exclusively centring on social citizenship. The 
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'new right' perspective is challenging the notion of social citizenship, but 
that said arguments about the definition of social citizenship are not 
restricted to the followers of the new right, being increasingly dominant 
on most political agendas. As McCormick argues, 
"New Labour orthodoxy holds that extending social justice is a 
requirement for economic efficiency... The 'Intelligent Welfare 
State' proposed by the Commission on Social Justice is 
rooted in improving opportunities to earn... Social justice is not 
just about cash transfers", (1997: 109). 
Therefore before drawing this section to a close the 'right' and 'left' 
perspectives on citizenship in the 1990's will be considered. 
Citizenship in the 1§§Q's 
Wolfe (1991) has identified two strands of 
conservatism, one he calls the 'social conservative' and the other 
'laissez-faire' conservative. Both strands of conservatism purport to 
want to get rid of 'big government', but there are some distinct 
differences between the two strands. The social Conservatives 
attempted to 'demonise' welfare. They dismissed the type of citizenship 
espoused by Marshall, arguing that welfare payments induced 
dependency . Welfare benefits have undermined family responsibilities, 
making it possible for 'undesirable' family forms to flourish, (Murray: 
1990). The most worrying developments so far as the new right is 
concerned is that the state has taken over the territory that would have 
previously remained in the remit of the family, the 'private space' of 
family responsibilities becoming incorporated within the parameters of 
public control. As Kelly, Kelly and Gamble argue "State intervention is 
regarded as an evil which always produces inferior results", (1997: 
239). 
By contrast, laissez-faire Conservatives 
believe that it is only by giving people absolute choice, for example in 
18 
schools opting out of local authority control, that true citizenship can be 
achieved. This group maintain that only through the free market will 
people realise their full potential. Hoy (1984), describes how Hayek 
recognises the value of individual freedom. He states of Hayek that "Not 
only does Hayek believe that the individual will best serve himself if he 
is free, but he also believes that if he is free he will best serve his fellow 
man", (1984: 23). Therefore, social cohesion can only be attained 
through the absolute freedom of the individual. It is only when 
individuals have satiated their desires that harmony will be achieved. 
So important elements of social citizenship in 
the Marshallian sense have come under assault. The notion of the 
welfare state being a protector now seems untenable and unrealistic. 
Frictional unemployment has given way to long-term structural 
unemployment, exacerbated by free market liberalism, (Dore: 1996). 
Full employment was the cornerstone of the welfare state, without full 
employment the system is seemingly grinding to a halt, with "universal 
social programmes.... dying a death by a thousand cuts", (Mishra, 1996, 
p316). An example of this is the erosion of services to the elderly. With 
the inception of 'Care in the Community', many elderly people, who will 
have possibly contributed for most of their adult life to the state system 
for services, will now have to rely on the good will of friends, family and 
neighbours for such care. Their right to receive services for which they 
have paid has been taken away, as Finch states, "People should have 
the right not to have to rely on their families", (1996:206). 
However, Marshall did not believe that the 
state should take over all the duties previously performed by families 
and communities, (Roche: 1996, Halsey: 1996), and indeed the welfare 
state was always supposed to be premised upon a 'mixed economy' of 
welfare, with state assistance intersecting with voluntary and familial 
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duty. It is this theme which has been revived by the 'New Labour' gurus, 
and arguably their ideas are now closer to those of Marshall than are 
those of the 'far left'. Therefore in principle, 'Care in the Community' 
would not have been so far removed from Marshall's notion of achieving 
social citizenship within a framework of assistance from the state and 
from the other sources. 
If Hutton is to be believed, that "social cohesion 
is deteriorating year by year", (1995: 323), if this is indeed the case, 
then how can a community able to look after those requiring care and 
assistance be maintained? Perhaps it is the case, that the welfare state 
has exceeded Marshall's expectations, and social citizenship rather 
than being based on an overlay of mutual rights and obligations has 
come to signify a purely contractual relationship between the individual 
and the state. 
Therefore the question that begs answering is 
what does being a citizen entail, and what should a citizen expect? It 
appears that we are now at a critical phase in deciding what can rightly 
be expected from the state as the world is now a different place to the 
world of the Marshalls and Beveridges of 1948. Can governments be 
expected to guarantee a job for life or is the most we can now hope for 
simply a job for life? If the welfare state is dying from a thousand cuts 
as Mishra intimated and society is now deteriorating year by year as 
Hutton suggests, then is it not a plausible to argue, that those without 
work and assistance from the state and community will simply be 
'disenfranchised* from certain aspects of citizenship? Are we simply 
fostering the notion of second class citizens or maybe even an 
'underclass' separated from society per se? Or maybe a more pertinent 
question is, can governments actually change anything in the face of 
global pressures, and is citizenship really a universal condition? 
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It is with these questions in mind that chapter 
two will begin by examining the influence that globalisation has 
exercised on citizenship status. Chapter two will therefore consider how 
the term might be defined, before moving on to discuss the impact of 
two global factors - communication networks and trans-national 
corporations - on our conception of citizenship. The chapter will also 
discuss whether citizenship should be considered in a global context. 
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Citizenship amid the GlobaSasation Process 
« This chapter will answer three key questions. 
The first task is to define what is meant by 'globalisation'. The second 
question, will consider the impact of globalisation upon the universal 
nature of citizenship, and whether the fragmentary nature of 
globalisation has created the conditions for 'difference*. To illustrate this 
point, global communications and TNC's will be examined to assess 
their impact upon the universality of citizenship. The third question will 
ask whether, if after considering the nature of globalisation and its 
effects on citizenship, we are currently moving into a 'post-national' 
phase of citizenship, where the sovereign state cannot guarantee 
universal citizenship rights and has less stake in setting standards for 
such rights. 
What is 'Globalisation'? 
Globalisation, has been described as being 
"the new buzzword casting gloom or delight depending on your 
perspective", (Hutton, 1997, p29). However, there is little consensus as 
to what globalisation means. Some commentators such as Pocock 
(199Q) describe globalisation as "the process by which the whole world 
has for many purposes become a single, rapidly interacting system", 
(1990: 319). This implies a consensual arrangement between the 
countries of the world, almost mirroring a functionalist approach. By 
contrast Waters (1995) would argue, that this image of consensuality is 
premised upon the spurious notion of harmony, Waters states that 
globalisation "appears to justify the spread of Western culture and of 
capitalist society by suggesting that there are forces operating beyond 
human control that are transforming the world", (1995: 3). Waters 
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argues that globalisation is not a force majeure, it is not something 
which is happening to the world, but is being actively created by it, he 
argues, "the global political economy is organised by the interaction of 
states" (1995: 33). 
Although Hutton describes globalisation as the 
new 'buzzword', some such as Wallerstein (1979) would argue , that 
globalisation developed alongside capitalism, that the modern world has 
evolved from the syntheses between economic affairs of nation-states, 
and that ultimately there is a single world capitalist economy which 
subjugates that of the nation-state. The world systems theory purports 
that no country can act or be understood in isolation, that the events 
which happen in one country nas ramifications for other countries in the 
world. 
Wallerstein's theory, is not however without its 
critics. As Worsley (1983) points out, nation-states did not adopt the 
capitalist model of economics simultaneously, and Wallerstein does not 
explain how socialist states fit into his notion of a capitalist world 
system. Where Worsley does agree with Wallerstein is that certain 
countries, essentially those which industrialised earlier, have the ability 
to keep other newly industrialised countries in a state of dependency. 
This notion of dependency is discussed by 
commentators such as Strange (1995) who argues that there has been 
a "great increase in the asymmetries of state authorities", (1995: 63). By 
this she means, that economies of countries such as the USA may 
have to cede some authority to global markets, but smaller countries 
not only have their economies challenged by global markets, but are 
also challenged by stronger economies such as those of the USA. 
George & Sabelli (1994) argue that even 
institutions which claim to be 'global' are really acting in the interests of 
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America. They quote, as an example, the 'World Bank', which in their 
view has become a tool of American foreign policy. George and Sabelli 
argue that, "the US has been able to prevent loans for its blacklisted 
countries (eg Nicaragua) from reaching the board of the World Bank" 
(1994: 214). The idea of 'Americanisation' will be picked up again later 
in this chapter. 
Arguably, some of the key players in the 
globalisation process are the spread of the Trans-national Corporations' 
(TNC's), (Petrella: 1996). Some TNC's have been described as having 
"assets and annual sales far in excess of the Gross National Product of 
most of the countries in the world", (Sklair, 1993, p7). The need to move 
capital now seemingly takes precedence over the need to maintain 
strict border controls. As Schmidt (1996) states, "capital has become 
increasingly mobile and business increasingly international as borders 
that act as barriers to trade fall and as regulations that constrain 
commerce are lifted" (1995: 75). This argument is supported by Van der 
Gaag, who believes "the world corporations are becoming stateless. 
They move factories and labs around the world without particular 
reference to national borders" (1996: 9). 
In essence the TNC has been courted by state 
governments. The TNC provides access to international markets, also 
they could be used as guarantors for loans for countries whose credit 
ratings were poor, (Strange: 1995). Governments used policy measures 
to encourage the settling of TNC's. 'Free trade zones' were set up, this 
is where outside corporations can work without having recourse to the 
normal protective legislation in force. There are no trade unions and 
generally there is a repository of cheap labour. In order to attract a TNC, 
tax 'holidays' are given, in some cases no local taxes will be paid for 
some considerable time, with all profits being repatriated, that said, as 
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capital now moves so freely "it is often impossible for governments to 
find it, let alone tax it", (Swift, 1994, p5) 
The TNC is an advocate of the free market 
principle. Government interference is supposedly anathema to the 
nature of the TNC. It is espoused by those advocates of the free market 
principle that, global capital will generate sufficient profits in order to 
service the needs of citizens, without the need for government control. It 
is propounded by those who subscribe to the free market theory that left 
to its own devices, the market will always provide the most satisfactory 
solutions, (Hutton: 1995). The main thrust of this view is that if products 
and services are desirable they will sell, if not then the company 
supplying will go out of business. However the 'Asian Tiger' economies 
are often heralded as the icons of free trade, even though, their 
governments have ignored the free market principle and have, as Swift 
suggests, "been very active: protectors of domestic markets", (1995: 5). 
The net result of TNC activity has certainly increased global trade and 
the flow of capital, but as Livingstone notes, "globalisation has not 
produced an even development of economic flows", (1996: 31), nor 
have they reduced the need for government interference, as the case of 
the Tigers' has illustrated. This point has not gone unnoticed by 
commentators like Petrella (1995). In his view the state and large 
companies form a symbiotic relationship, the TNC's need states to go 
'global', and the state needs TNC's as they provide a "continuity of 
legitimacy", (1995: 76). 
Of course, economic activity alone cannot 
adequately explain the process of globalisation. Some say that 
globalisation is about the relative standardisation of culture. Mass 
immigration has certainly added to the idea of most societies in the 
world being described as 'multi-cultural', and also the spread of 
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products such as 'Macdonalds' and 'Pepsi Cola', adds to the belief that 
we are living in a global context, (Ritzer: 1996). 
One of the chief ways in which we learn about 
other cultures is via the media and other global communication 
networks, such as telephones, fax machines and the Internet. Some 
such as Featherstone would argue that we are now, 
"global citizens in the sense that we participate in a global 
society which transcends any nation-state boundary. We are 
fused between the local and the global, having little use for 
the machinations of the nation-state, which had been 
consigned to surviving within 'historical imaginaries'", (1995: 
99). 
Featherstone places more emphasis on the 
idea of culture being the globalising feature, culture for him takes 
precede1i?)over economic and political features. The growth of mass 
communications and media means that everyone in the world has the 
ability to see images that transcend time and space. For example, we 
can all see people competing in world events such as the 'Olympic 
Games', at the time that they happen. People all over the world can 
simultaneously be exposed to the same images. 
The globalisation of culture debate, has also 
informed discussions about the nature of post-modernity, (Sklair: 
1993). 'Cyber space', suggests that in the post-modern world, we have 
the ability to create identities which are not shackled to traditionally 
accepted notions of territoriality. Robins (1995) argues that cyber space 
can recreate fantasies. Everything we are denied in the material world 
can be obtained from the cyber world. He states that, 
"the technology is invested by omnipotence fantasies. In the 
virtual world, it is suggested, we shall receive all the 
gratifications that we are entitled to, but have been deprived 
of; in this world, we can reclaim the [infantile] illusion of 
magical creative power", (1995: 139). 
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Furthering this discussion, Robins adds that 
cyber space canjiot only satisfy the desires which are unavailable in the 
material world, but it can cut across ethnic and gender boundaries. The 
body itself may be longer the repository of identity; in cyber space it can 
be secondary to the social identity constructed by the mind. This 
statement has important ramifications for the study of citizenship, which 
will be considered in the next part of this chapter. If we can really 
transcend the physical limits of our bodies, then on what basis can 
'rights' be ascribed to individuals simply because physical 'selves' are 
located within certain geographical boundaries. 
However, Giddens (1990) would argue that 
globalisation is a product of modernity and not post-modernity, as he 
argues that the globalisation process is far from completion. We have, 
he explains reached a point where people no longer root themselves in 
tradition. The process of late modernity means that social life is 
constantly questioned, we can no longer simply take for granted actions 
carried out because 'that's how we always do things'. Giddens calls this 
process Yeflexivity', in the reflexive process, he states "the routinisation 
of daily life has no intrinsic connections with the past at all", (1990: 38). 
In summary, globalisation has been described 
as a functionally coherent system, a system which has emerged in its 
own right, something orchestrated through inter-governmental action, a 
'by-product'-of capitalism, a system of Westernisation, the spread of 
global culture, a way to re-invent ourselves, and the smashing of 
tradition. So which explanation is the correct one? 
In a sense globalisation encompasses all of 
these discussions and because the arguments surrounding citizenship 
are informed by the debates about globalisation, it is understandable , 
that citizenship cannot be so neatly defined in one snappy sound-bite. 
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That is why, we can only really explore the different possible facets of 
citizenship as opposed to providing a generally agreed definition of the 
idea. The next part of this chapter will consider the nature of the 
relationship between globalisation and the concept of citizenship. 
How Does Qiobaiisation Inform Our Understanding of Citizenship? 
After examining academic arguments and 
debates about globalisation, there is a tendency to believe that the 
process subsumes all in its path, that globalisation is an inexorable 
force which renders the nation-state 'useless'. 
If the nation-state is moribund, (Thrift: 1994), 
then, there is an argument for citizenship to be discussed not within the 
remit of nation-state boundaries but as something which is an attribute 
of membership of the human race. The debate therefore about 'what is 
globalisation?' must now be entwined with 'what are the ramifications of 
globalisation on citizenship?'. It must be noted, that some academics, 
for example Hirst and Thompson (1996), believe that the impact of 
globalisation has been overstated, and that the nation-state is still a key 
player in the world order. Therefore this section will look at the overlay 
between globalisation and citizenship. The final section will ask whether 
or not we are entering a period where the nation-state can remain a 
suitable custodian of citizenship rights. 
This section will look to two areas of 
globalisation: global communications and TNC's, beginning with a 
discussion about how global expansion of communications may have 
affected citizenship. Global communications have deeply impacted into 
our lives, from Rupert Murdoch's 'Star TV' network, to the computer and 
Internet. 
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One must of course be careful to make the 
distinction between the ownership of the varying communications 
networks. The media, (by the media, it is meant television stations and 
newspapers), is owned by relatively few individuals. As Hoffman states, 
"there has been a concentration of ownership and a 
concomitant uniformity of product.... The concentration of 
political and commercial power in the hands of such media 
groups as Murdoch's News International is well documented", 
( 1994: 60). 
However, it has been mooted that the fastest growing communications 
network, the 'Internet' is the ideal vehicle for freedom of speech and 
freedom from interference from any political or economic source. 
The Internet has indeed stirred some very 
deep emotions. It has been hailed as either the saviour of democracy or 
some sort of malignant force able to smash communities and spy on 
individuals. As Davidson says, "some have predicted they [the modem 
and the Internet] will lead either to greater democracy and participation 
in intellectual discussions or to greater fragmentation of society", ( 1995: 
38). 
The Internet, because communication is via 
text rather than pictorial images, masks the identity of the sender. In a 
world where gender and race are perceived as being important factors 
in how we deal with each other, then the banality and the anonymity the 
text provides are powerful equalising tools. As Davidson notes, the 
"blandness of text should cut through sexism, racism and obsession 
with class or status that is so prevalent in more traditional forms of 
interactive communication", (1995: 38). 
To this extent then, the 'net' can be considered 
an 'egalitarian' form of communication, people are judged on the merits 
of their thoughts, which have been translated into the written word, 
rather than judged any other aspect of identity. In its most direct sense 
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a democratic way of communication has been formed: everyone 
engaging with the net does so by direct access and not, as in the case 
of democracy within nation-states, via indirect representation. 
Therefore the net affords individuals the right to engage in freedom of 
speech, and more importantly the freedom of movement of such 
speech throughout the globe, therefore satisfying one of the basic 
tenets of a democratic society. 
Some commentators go further. Johnstone, 
(1994), for example, believes that the need for nation-states to engage 
in global communications and technological network, has actually 
precipitated change within certain countries. He cites the example of 
Singapore, which has "staked its future on becoming a global nerve 
centre for media and communications", ( 1994: 38). The Singaporean 
government is in a state of turmoil apropos the global communications 
network, which challenges its ethos of (not always benign) paternalism, 
(Johnstone, 1994: 41). 
The Singaporean Government needs the 
technology, so it may have to rethink its approach. Here is a case 
where the new communications networks have succeeded in changing 
government attitudes. It is possible that other governments in a similar 
position to the Singaporeans may be forced towards a more democratic 
path. 
By allowing information to flow freely around 
the world, it is hoped that people will be more fully informed regarding 
events and happenings in other parts of the world. For example the 
power of global communications cannot be negated when considering 
the role they played in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. By 
allowing freedom of information, the citizenship rights taken for granted 
by some, have been conferred onto the South African populace. The 
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suggestion here is not that South Africa is not now without problems, 
but at least by accepting the inequalities that were rife within the 
system, and the total absence of basic citizenship rights for the majority 
of its population, some attempts can be made to redress the situation, 
Being 'on-line' can mean being alert to potential 
problems occurring globally. As Hoffman states, "members of the 
'human rights community' such as Index and Amnesty, have been using 
bulletin boards, electronic mail and conferencing systems to 
communicate among themselves and to alert others to abuses requiring 
publicity", (1994: 60). 
Robin's (1995), quotes Rheingold, as saying 
that with the power of the Internet, 
"we shall be able to rebuild the neighbourhood communities, 
and the small-town public sphere and, in a world in which 
every citizen is networked to every other citizen, we can 
expand this ideal [or myth] to the scale of the global village. 
Virtual communities, are social aggregations that emerge 
from the net", (1995: 136). 
If the argument put forward by Pocock is considered, that is 
"nationalism, community and sovereignty are psychological in nature", 
(1990: 318), that is we create our own identities within our own minds, 
then in this case the net is satisfying the tenets of community spirit by 
allowing equal access to the arena of public debate and therefore 
providing the citizens of the net with a mutual support network. 
Therefore it is arguably the case that the techno-nerds surfing the 'net' 
may be receiving support, understanding and all the concomitant 
attributes generally considered as being part of human face to face 
relationships, they are a citizen body. In this sense the Internet is 
embracing the notion of 'difference'. 
However, so far it has been suggested that 
global communications have been a favourable aspect of the 
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globalisation process, it is now time to consider the problems 
associated with them. 
The first thing to consider was mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, and that is not all means of global 
communications are necessarily untainted by censorship and prejudice. 
Rupert Murdoch, for example, controls huge tracts of the media, and is 
seemingly not against using his power to influence the content of many 
newspaper and television reports. To this extent then, the democratic 
right to free speech can be damaged, if the media is only ever given to 
presenting one point of view. 
Although the 'Media Moguls' have the freedom 
to print and broadcast what they like, because some are so basically 
inculcated with one set of political beliefs, they are failing to give a more 
balanced account of what is happening in the world at large, hence the 
idea of the democratic process of free speech runs into difficult territory. 
Surely, free speech can only be described as everyone contributing 
their points of view as opposed to the freedom of speech of a chosen 
few - those rich enough to be able to purchase and control the media. 
One must also query the notion of the 'global' 
market being truly global in the sense of cultural diversity or rather the 
lack of cultural diversity offered by the media barons. Hoffman refers to 
the potential Americanisation of global communications as opposed to 
being given insights into the varying lifestyles, he uses the 'CNN' 
network to illustrate this point stating, 
"CNN was hailed as a start-up, cable TV rival to the news 
services of the big broadcast companies, but despite the 
global span, there is an evident US 'spin' to its news values 
that flattens as much as it enriches the diversity of global 
reporting", (1994: 60), 
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though the point of Americanisation will be considered later in the 
discussion of whether we have globalisation or Americanisation with 
global outlets. 
Davidson suggests that the Internet is still not 
without problems. The Internet is purported to be the ideal forum for 
freedom of speech, and yet is dominated by a few, as Davidson states, 
"As much as people have wanted to go on talking about how 
democratic it is, the Internet is still the domain of middle-class, highly 
educated, white males of a certain age", (1995: 42). In this sense, if the 
'net' is dominated by a few, then how can it encompass the notion of 
difference? 
Communication networks also can enhance 
activities of socially unacceptable groups. Just as the 'human rights 
community' uses new technology to further its fight against what is 
considered injustice, so other groups use new technology to muster 
assistance for their groups - groups which will try and deny citizenship 
rights to others, as Hoffman notes, "Internet communication is not 
necessarily benign, a German journalist says 'neo-nazi efficiency has 
improved dramatically now that they're using electronic communications 
networks",(1994: 61). It is an inevitable consequence of something 
which is good, that something bad occurs, it is also naive to assume 
that those whose intentions are not honourable will not be able to make 
use of such a system. 
The speed at which messages are sent 
throughout the world can either be considered an advantage or a 
disadvantage. It would be difficult to doubt the veracity of the claim that 
Nelson Mandela was surely released from prison in part because of the 
world's attention being focused on South Africa, nor can it be denied 
that America was forced to reflect on its activities when a video of 
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Rodney King being beaten was shown on international television. That 
said, if the case of the Belgian paedophile ring is considered , then the 
speed and accessibility of information can be frightening, and ultimately 
shows how vulnerable the system is to abuse. The paedophile ring 
used the global network to send images of child pornography world 
wide, thus denigrating children's right to protection. 
This means the question of regulation must be 
considered. At the moment we have a situation where nobody appears 
to be certain about how to deal with this problem, though many still do 
not accept that there is a problem. Do we start censoring information, 
which means the democratic rights of citizens to engage in free speech 
will be damaged or do we state that with freedom comes responsibility, 
and someone has to be responsible for ensuring that one persons 
freedom of speech does not impinge onto another persons freedom to 
be protected. Thrift believes that, "for some observers, this is a situation 
presaging great institutional and regulatory uncertainty", (1994: 368). As 
yet no solution has been found, as this is the contradiction within liberal 
democracy, which takes precedent the freedom of the individual or duty 
to others? 
As stated at the beginning, this chapter is 
essentially concerned with the ramifications globalisation has for 
citizenship rights, and arguably two key players in the globalisation 
process are communication networks and TNC's. Having discussed 
how global communications have impacted upon citizenship rights, the 
next section will consider the relationship between citizenship rights and 
TNC's. 
TNC's and Their Impact on Citizenship 
Earlier in this chapter, the sheer magnitude of 
the TNC was discussed, here the point of focus will be the part TNC's 
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play in the globalisation process, and their possible impact on 
citizenship. A recent article in Time Magazine' succinctly sums up the 
role of the TNC: the article states that TNC's, " were not made to 
succour the masses", (Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p38). The main 
function of the TNC is to deliver goods cheaply and efficiently to satiate 
the desires of the consumer. It appears that the new global scenario is 
of the consumer as 'king', the economy seemingly driven by the sole 
interest of the consumer, to such an extent that the needs of the 
consumer supplants the needs of governments. 
In order to meet demand, TNC's inexorably 
pursue cheap and flexible labour, and often, environmental regulations 
are ignored, as Swift believes, the TNC's prefer "job-hungry regions with 
weak trade-unions like Samsung's new electronics plant in Newcastle, 
Great Britain, or Hyundai's car-production facility in the eastern 
township of Quebec",(1995: p4). It must be noted though, that the TNC 
has in part initially orchestrated this scenario. Many factories closed in 
the West, because production could be relocated to the East where 
costs are cheaper. As Betcherman notes, 
"Although business still faces serious obstacles in locating 
high-technology, high value added operations in LDC's this is 
changing. Examples such as state of the art Indian engineers 
and world class Mexican automakers are becoming more 
fre,quent. And, while these workers may be highly paid by the 
standard of their own countries, their compensation is far 
below that received by productive workers in.... other 
developed nations", (1996: 263). 
Woolston (1989) draws attention to the notion 
that flexibility "demands trade union collaboration as the price of 
survival" (1989: 65). He uses the 'Ford Caterpillar Plant' in Scotland as 
an example of how large firms engineered the situation where the 
perceived inefficiencies of the 'Ford' plant in Scotland meant they could 
relocate, safe in the knowledge that they could justify their actions. 
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Trades unions were blamed for the closure of the 'Caterpillar Plant'. As 
Woolston notes, "the backward attitudes of the Scottish trade union 
movement on Dundee is the main reason for the country's 
unemployment and the loss of new investment" (1989: 55) and not that 
"in the face of continued pressure from the company's 
stockholders to reduce operating costs and in the light of the 
precipitate fall in the value of the dollar against the pound. 
This had made it much less profitable to manufacture in 
Britain" (1989: 53) 
The TNC's are not above using their power, 
which, by comparison to many nation-states is considerable, in order to 
achieve their aims. As stated in Time Magazine', "bullying your host 
government is only the start. With many Third World states 
disintegrating, multi-nationals are expected to be ersatz government", 
(Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p50). 
As stated earlier in this chapter, TNC's are 
proponents of the free market principle, and many governments have 
succumbed to the perceived pressures to espouse free market 
liberalism themselves. However as Drache (1996) notes, although 
TNC's subscribe to the notion of the free market, their business is far 
from being so, with much trade being within the global corporations, 
Drache sums the situation up as this "after more than forty years of 
liberalised trade, experts agree that only one quarter of global trade is 
considered to conform to the precepts of trade liberalisation", (1996: 
38). 
Livingstone (1996), argues that the free market 
ideal has direct consequences for democracy. He states that, 
"The political implications of the free market model are 
equally profound because it necessitates a radical reduction in 
democracy. The organising principle of democracy is that 
every citizen, regardless of status, has one equal vote. In the 
free market decisions are taken by unequal agents... One 
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person supplying capital may decide to dismiss 100,000 
supplying labour", (1996: 3). 
Indeed this has been seen to be the case. 
Production globally has increased, but accompanying this has also 
been an increase in unemployment. As Swift notes, 
"while total world output has doubled since 1975, 
employment has actually declined. The global economy with 
its emphasis on reducing labour costs and on currency or 
property speculation does not put a high priority on providing 
sustainable livelihoods", (1994: 6). 
With unemployment regarded as the scourge 
of the west, is it fair to suggest that the practices of the TNC's 
exacerbate the problem? The debate now rages about whether in the 
Western world we have a group of people permanently excluded from 
the labour market - an 'underclass' (Murray: 1990). In fact the issue has 
now gone further to discuss whether the working poor can now be 
considered to be in the 'underclass'. 
In the West, especially America, the notion of 
citizenship is intrinsically linked with employment. In Britain citizenship 
was linked with the welfare state. The more rights people had, the more 
inclusive citizenship became. As Amenta & Skocpol note, 
"At the end of a decade of war and reconversion, a 
comprehensive national welfare state had been created in 
Great Britain; meanwhile the United States had settled into 
other patterns. Despite the dream of New Deal and early 
wartime planners for a distinctively American full-employment 
welfare state, nearly all possibilities for nationalized social 
policy had been eliminated from the agenda of mainstream 
politics", (1988: 121). 
The globalisation process appears to be 
changing the way citizenship is viewed. As Lister (1997) notes 
globalisation is impacting upon social policy limiting the ability of nation-
states to set their own social agendas. Moreover, Britain is certainly 
emulating America, with the universal nature of social citizenship being 
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called into question. As Lister argues "In a number of societies, 
European as well as American, there is increasing emphasis on work 
obligations as a badge of social inclusion and citizenship", (1997: 103). 
However, as stated earlier, this appears to be disenfranchising people 
from the system, thus negating citizenship rights. 
Global organisations, such as the 'World Bank' 
and the 'International Monetary Fund' (IMF), have been instrumental in 
affecting citizenship rights. Their structural adjustment programmes, 
have forced many nation-states to privatise public utilities, giving control 
and ownership of essential services to people whose main aim is to 
make a profit. As Sandberg states, 
"The idea that you can take core utilities and sell them on a 
practically unregulated basis to some group of foreigners to 
make hay with strikes me as so irresponsible that it is certain 
to backfire", (1994: p14). 
We now have a situation locally in the North 
East of England, where 'Northumbrian Water' is owned by a French 
multi-national, and an American company called 'Cal-Energy' - with an 
appalling safety record - is bidding to purchase 'Northern Electric', and 
as Sandberg states, "what we are left with in the meantime, however, is 
a return to the nightmare of private monopolies running essential 
services. This creates a democratic vacuum with ever sharper divisions 
between rich and poor", (1994: 15). 
Arguably, corporations now have more say in 
how a country is run, than governments. Accompanying this has been 
the IMF/World Bank policy of promoting industrialisation as the panacea 
for poverty. However, industrialisation has not been such an agreeable 
remedy, as noted in 'Time Magazine', "it sounds unpalatable, but the 
only chance for developing countries to develop is to accept higher 
pollution levels or lower wages", (Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p38). So in 
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order to survive in the market, and to satisfy the 'Structural Adjustment 
Programmes', which have the effect of being able "to pry open the 
Southern economies to the world market", (Swift, 1994, p5), many 
governments have been selling their workers 'short'. The workers have 
been placed in a 'catch 22' situation: either they accept that they will 
receive poor wages and environmental damage or they do not work. 
Hirst and Thompson (1996), as mentioned in 
the beginning of this chapter are sceptical about the magnitude of 
globalisation. For them workers still have bargaining power and nation-
states still have the capacity for self-governance. Hirst and Zeitlin 
(1991), acknowledge that over the past couple of decades there has 
been an unprecedented change in the world economy. However they 
argue, that it is incorrect simply to assume that this is due to a 
transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production. They draw 
important distinctions between post-Fordism and what is known as 
flexible specialisms. For them, post-Fordism masks the intricacies 
involved in such a transition. For them the term 'flexible specialisms' is a 
more appropriate term to describe the current situation, where there is a 
need for the nation-state, large corporations and regional bodies to 
foster cooperation. Arguably then, no one institution has primacy over 
the other, and in a sense, this challenges the notion of globalisation 
being an entity which subsumes everything in its path. Therefore nation-
states - and indeed if Hirst & Zeitlin's analysis of the situation is correct -
local communities are not merely 'victims' of globalisation, they are 
conscious actors. Brazier (1996), draws attention to the current trend to 
take direct action. He argues that many workers and active groups have 
joined forces in order to stave of actions of predatory TNC's, he quotes 
one example of the "Native American Daniel Zapata who is fighting the 
open-cast mining of a British multi-national Hanson [has], forged 
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links with the indigenous Igorisi people in the Philippine Cordillera" 
(1996: 8). For Brazier as well as Hirst and Thompson, whilst there is no 
intention of drawing links between them on globalisation policies, both 
parties agree that workers still do have powers of representation and 
bargaining. 
However, globalisation can bring varying 
problems such as the inculcation of differing working practices. The 
'Japanisation' of work is now a point for discussion. As Waters states 
"the new organisational paradigm can be operated in any enterprise and 
indeed can be exported beyond the business sector to other types of 
organisation", (1995: 85). The result is that whether people are working 
in Japan, Fiji, America or Great Britain, the employer demands that the 
workers from differing cultures perform to a uniform standard of guiding 
principles. In effect then, armies of workers are changing their identity to 
suit a company whose head office may be thousands of miles away. 
The personality of the worker is being changed and controlled to suit the 
needs of capitalism, the worker is being primed not to meet the needs 
of the direct locality or even country, but to meet the needs and 
standards set by someone whose culture may be very different. 
Perhaps it is the case, especially with the 
demise of trade-unions and the feeling of comradeship, workers may 
feel a sense of alienation. To elaborate, we now see a division of labour 
by process and not product. As Van der Gaag states, 
"we talk of goods 'made in Britain' or 'made in Japan' or 
'made in US'. In fact, they are far more likely to have been 
made in Korea, assembled in Malaysia, sewn together in 
Taiwan and then shipped to the country where they are 
supposed to have been made", (1996: 9). 
The division of labour by process, (Hall: 1993) further adds to the 
impotency of trade unions. In the days when whole products were made 
at, for example, a car plant, because the whole product was made at 
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the plant, then any form of industrial action would close down the whole 
production. Now workers would be merely stopping production on just 
one part of the whole process. It must also be the case, 'united we 
stand divided we fall', when it comes to looking at the whole product, 
parts may be made in countries using non-unionised labour, thus 
prohibiting any chance of any cooperative action between workers 
throughout the processes which go to make up the whole product. 
Foreign investors are often thought of as the 
'saviour' of an area, but really this idea must also be queried. Foreign 
investors certainly provide employment, that cannot be denied, but they 
are not loyal to an area and unlike the Victorian entrepreneurs, such as 
Owen in New Lanarkshire who sought, albeit in a paternalistic way, to 
improve the social conditions of his workers, the "TNC's have never 
shown themselves either interested in or capable of looking after the 
welfare of anyone", (Kneen, 1995, p25). We now have the scenario 
where labour is rooted locally but capital is not. Decisions pertaining to 
workers lives may be made thousands of miles away, thus negating 
local empowerment, (Lloyd: 1996). 
This raises the question of what has been 
referred to as 'glocalisation'. How we construct our personal identity is 
increasingly becoming confusing. As Leadbitter states, 
"there is a gap between the global scale of modern economic 
life and the local terms in which people conceive their 
identities and make their choices. That gap is disorienting; our 
sense of ourselves, our plans and expectations can suddenly 
be uprooted by forces outside of our control", (1996: 17). 
Perhaps we are seeking to find the 'old-fashioned' type of community 
and identity, where the citizen body is relatively homogeneous. If we go 
on holiday we expect to feel and experience another way of life, hence it 
could be the case that someone is a Turkish belly dancer by night, 
entertaining the tourists, and then goes home to sip Coca-cola and 
41 
watch some American soap series on the television. Community may 
have been reduced to something voyeuristic, we can watch the village 
blacksmith work, excepting he is making wares for the tourist as 
opposed to making wares for the village. The local is therefore 
pandering to the global; the very livelihood of'local' may depend on how 
they treat the 'other', who has probably arrived via a package tour. As 
Holtzner and Robertson argue, "Situations which can be defined very 
broadly as anomic ones of excessive uncertainty may be such that they 
lead to the destruction of existing identities and the search for 
substitutes" (1980: 29). 
It at this point that the discussion on the 
ramifications of globalisation for citizenship will come to a close, as the 
next section must consider where the protection for citizens must lie, 
with the nation-state or with other supra-national bodies. 
Citizenship Rights or Human Rights? 
This section aims to examine the issues behind 
the notion of citizenship being a status given by merit of being a 
member of a nation-state, or if citizenship and indeed the nation-state 
are anachronistic concepts which have no place in the global context of 
human rights. 
It has been previously discussed that 
citizenship and the nation-state have been historically linked; they 
share a symbiotic relationship. However, Soysal (1996) suggests that 
citizenship is now entering what has been described as a 'post-national 
phase', where rights are accorded to the person in the form of human 
rights and not because they are citizens of a territorially defined area. 
She states that, "This emphasis on rights is expressed through a 
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codification of 'human rights' as a world-level organizing principle in 
legal, scientific and popular conventions", (1996: 19). 
So is it the case that "the nation-state is too 
small for the big things, and too big for the small", (Van der Gaag, 1996, 
p10)? Or as Strange explains is, "the proposition in short,... that state 
authority has leaked away, upwards sideways and downwards", (1995: 
56). This chapter has already shown how global organisations such as 
TNC's have impacted upon traditional forms of citizenship, therefore it 
is now time to discuss who is actually offering protection to the 
individual, especially as noted earlier that TNC's "were not made to 
succour the masses", (Time, 19.08.96, p38). 
Turner (1993) argues that there is a need to 
develop a discourse of human rights within sociology in contrast to a 
discourse of citizenship. He states that "sociology of human rights is 
important, because there are obvious limitations to the idea of 
citizenship, which is based on membership of a nation-state", (1993: 3). 
Mendus (1995) argues, that the reason behind the lack of discussion 
on human rights, is because to acknowledge human rights is to place 
the individual in constant tension with the state, thus discrediting the 
vision of socialist Utopia. She states that, 
"where human rights are asserted, they are asserted as 
claims by individuals and against the power of the state, or 
against other individuals. But to assume that rights are 
needed against the state is to assume that there must always 
be antagonism between the interests of the state and the 
interests of individuals, and this is a denial of the kind of ideal 
society envisaged by socialists and communitarians alike", 
(1995: 12). 
Therefore, if, as argued, communities are 
made up of citizens, then the citizen body must have regulations in 
place that have been agreed upon, however, where does this leave the 
individual who may not agree with the regulations in place? If relying 
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purely on the nation-state and no other supra-national body to protect 
the rights of individuals, then there could be a case for relativism. Some 
countries may have in place extremely harsh measures for dealing with 
those who disagree with the prevailing political system, if these people 
are only afforded the protection of citizenship of the nation-state, then 
there is no case for any other persons to interfere, as it is the case that 
any punishment meted out will be relative to that country. 
This is a problematic situation. If citizenship is 
intrinsically linked with boundaries, then which rights take precedence? 
Citizenship rights as proposed by domestic policy or human rights which 
maintain that "human beings, who in the words of Article 1 of the 
Declaration, 'are born free and equal in dignity and rights' rather than 
the national (citizens) of a given state", (Rosas, 1995: 63)? 
in order to perhaps provide a solution to this 
problem, citizenship must be understood in terms of identity as opposed 
to simply being something conferred upon a person by merit of where 
they have been born. Gamble (1996) argues that "Democracy in the 
twentieth century tended to become increasingly centralised" (1996: 
129). He believes firmly that there is a need to encompass 'difference'. 
He states that what is required is "a release of social energy and social 
imagination, a synergy which new forms of governance and new kinds 
of market might provide" (1996: 130). The notion of'difference* is worthy 
of consideration as it is arguable as to whether any citizen body, 
whether of a nation-state or sub-national 'community', has such 
homogeneity of culture - identities are not fixed wholly by nationality, 
(consider Britain for example, there are many different cultures and 
identities at work), therefore the argument for relativism is inappropriate, 
as what is the 'relative culture' of anywhere? Therefore just as cultures 
are permeable, then so must be boundaries. Human rights discourse is 
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therefore not simply about transcending boundaries, it is really about 
deciding where boundaries should be drawn. As Mendus states, 
"in some sense, therefore , it is misleading to refer to human 
rights as reflecting an aspiration to transcend national or 
cultural boundaries rights begin from the political and 
social realities of all our lives, and address problems about 
the forms which negotiation may take in circumstances where 
such boundaries are disputed, or identities fragmented", 
(1995: 18). 
Indeed, as Mahbub ul-Haq, (described by 
Brazier (1994) as a 'visionary' at the UN), believes firmly global bodies 
such as the UN must now consider that most conflict is not between 
nations but within nations. He thinks that" the UN has to do a number 
of things. First, it has to recognize conceptually that the security of 
people is just as important as the security of nations", (1994: 21). The 
lack of war between states has been instrumental in calling to account 
the nation-state, as citizenship rights were originally conferred onto 
those who were willing to serve their countries during times of inter-
state wars. The majority of the war zones throughout the world are 
within the boundaries of nation-states, and in some cases violence is 
used as a justifiable method of bringing rebel forces to heal by corrupt 
governments, an example of this is the present trouble in Algeria, where 
it is alleged that the Government is actually at the root of much of the 
violence. 
So human rights must be seen as having a 
justifiable 'objective' status outside of the remit of the state. As Turner 
states, 
"Human rights, insofar as they are extra-political or supra-
societal rights which have their legitimacy beyond the state, 
are crucial in protecting individuals against state violence, or 
at least in providing the normative grounds on which 
individuals could be protected against state violence", 
(1993:502). 
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There is now a profusion of governmental organisations such as the 
'United Nations' (UN) and the 'European Union' (EU), and non-
governmental agencies such as 'Amnesty International' and 'Oxfam', 
which are seen as key players in protecting the individual from violence, 
famine and other forms of exploitation. 
However, whilst not wishing to negate the 
power of supra-national bodies, it seems naive to think that they can act 
as a panacea for the problems experienced by individuals. If a 
government decides to keep such bodies out of its internal affairs then 
ultimately, if the nation-state is sufficiently large and strong and wants to 
resist what is perceived as 'outside interference', then it will be able to 
do so. Raphael (1991) believes that ultimately, international law is not 
superior to state law, as international law can only apply if the state 
chooses to acknowledge such a law. He states that " the present legal 
position is that many (though not all) rules of international law are 
binding on a State only if that State voluntarily accepts them as binding", 
(1991: 53). China is a case in question. Kristoff & Wundon (1994) 
describe in graphic detail terrible crimes committed against individuals 
in the name of the state - and China is one of the five permanent 
members of the U.N Security Council. A threat to cut of China's 'most 
favoured nation status' did bring about some concessions to human 
rights, but this was short-lived and eventually there was a disentangling 
of human rights from the trading benefits of 'most favoured nation'. 
China is a powerful country and, despite attempts to make it a more 
open society, it remains largely closed, and therefore able to carry out 
atrocities with the relative comfort of knowing that its actions will remain 
largely outside public scrutiny. 
It is therefore unwise to underestimate the 
power of the nation-state. It is also unwise to ignore the pull of 
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nationalism. Struggles such as those in the former Yugoslavia and 
Chechnya are a constant reminder of the importance of national 
identity. It seems an absurd statement to make, but whilst academia 
engages in apocalyptic warnings heralding the demise of the nation-
state, there has been an increase in the amount of new countries being 
'born'. As Van der Gaag notes, "nationalist struggles have a long 
history, but the quest for nationhood - often using the tools of violence -
is today at flood level", (1996: 8). The nation-state must still have some 
role to play in today's world, otherwise why would so many people shed 
so much blood in either protecting their 'nation' or by striving to form 
new 'nations'. 
Hence the nation-state cannot be simply 
ignored or written off as an anachronism. Consequently the way forward 
must be to try and mesh together the supra-national, national and the 
sub-national. Schmidt (1995) suggests the new role for the nation-state 
should be as a mediator between the sub-national and supra-national 
levels. She states that " the nation-state will continue to be the prime 
interlocutor in an increasingly complex world, and the only one that 
speaks with authority to both supra-national and sub-national 
authorities", (1995: 101), however this argument will be further 
discussed in the following chapter on the European Union. 
Geoffrey Howe, (now Lord Howe of Aberavon) 
(1995), believes the way forward is to employ the notion of 'power-
sharing'. He cites South Africa's new regime as an example of 'power-
sharing', where all South Africa's ethnic groups are afforded a say in 
government. However, as Phillips (1993) cautiously warns, power-
sharing can produce greater conflict, she quotes Nigeria as an example 
where varying ethnic groups turned the situation into one of extreme 
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tension, describing how the groups simply jostled for power and 
resources. She states that, 
"Where societies are divided between advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups, it does seem crucial to establish 
mechanisms that will equalize the balance of power. But such 
mechanisms can perpetuate the problem, and may not 
respond readily enough to change", (1993: 97). 
And of course, the power of TNC's cannot be 
ignored, they do have a role to play in guaranteeing human rights 
abuses are stopped or at least minimised, despite the bad press that 
many TNC's receive. It does appear that the TNC's are in transition, a 
transition which may result in what has been described as "corporate 
statesmanship", (The Observer, 11.05.97, p6). Ironically, whilst the TNC 
has been accused by commentators like Ellwood (1996) of destroying 
the unique culture of a region and promoting standardisation of product 
and culture, the other side of the argument is that such standardisation 
can actually increase the standard of living of the workers - for example, 
if the standard of living experienced by a car worker in a 'third world' 
country is brought up to the standard his or her counterpart enjoys in 
the 'first world' 
There is also a tension existing within 
capitalism between the need to produce profit for shareholders and the 
need tq acknowledge that in today's climate, there is a need for an 
ethical underpinning of the market. As Lloyd states, "the brusque 
rejection of other-than-profit criteria falls before the assault (sometimes 
literally) of rights groups, religious groups, politicians under pressure 
and even - a new phenomenon - competitors sneakily using ethical 
means to gain market share", (1997: 28). 
Ransom (1994), explains how 'Cafe Direct', a 
cooperative trying to achieve fair prices for the coffee producers of 
Peru, has now achieved 2.85 per cent of the market for ground coffee 
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in the UK. Arguably, there is now a new ethos stirring within business, 
that companies must also consider people as well as profit. A recent 
article in The Observer of 15th December 1996, records details of how 
companies such as 'Disney' are increasingly being drawn into human 
rights issues, the article states that, 
"corporations are increasingly aware of their responsibilities 
for the protection of human rights in the countries in which 
they do business... consumers are much more aware now, so 
companies can't just say 'don't look to us - we're just here to 
make a dollar'. That argument rings hollow to most people", 
(The Observer, 15.12.96, p6). 
A further article in The Observer' of 11th May 1997, states that 'Shell' 
has included a commitment to 'Human Rights' within their business 
plan, though it is unsure as to what exactly 'Shell' means by this 
statement. Indeed companies like 'Shell' with an annual turnover larger 
than the GDP of many of the countries it does business with, is capable 
of using its position to secure a commitment from reticent governments 
to the advancement of human rights. 
However, it is not wise to get too carried away 
with the notion that TNC's are now the world's police force and saviour 
of the oppressed. As Boyer and Drache (1996) note, "such a form of 
governance suffers from a lack of democratic accountability" (1996: 7). 
An article in 'The Observer' of 3rd November 1996, reveals a dark side 
of the TNC, one which is willing to abuse its power for the sake of profit. 
It is also noted within the article that the payment of monies from the 
multi-nationals to the host government, to ensure the relative safety of 
the property and installations of the TNC, were considered to be a 
normal part of business, as stated in the article, 
"He [the associate president] confirmed, however, that on top 
of a $1.25-a-barrel 'war tax' paid to the government, BP also 
paid a voluntary $5.6 million (about £3.5m) to the army under 
a three-year 'agreement on cooperation'. This, he said, was to 
provide the 16th Brigade with decent uniforms, food and 
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accommodation, but he admitted BP had no ultimate control 
over how the money was spent" (The Observer, 03.11.96, 
P6). 
CoracflosSoin 
This chapter has considered the impact of 
globalisation, particularly the impact of TNC's and global 
communications upon citizenship; it has also examined whether the 
nation-state is really the appropriate guardian of citizenship, or whether 
as has been suggested we have now reached a period of 'post-
nationalism' where international law and not national law should 
determine the fate of the individual. 
It has been shown that the nation-state has 
indeed had its power curbed, for now global capital flows without any 
consideration for nation-state boundaries, and new technology means 
that information can speed around the globe, uninterrupted and 
uncensored. The reality of the situation appears to be that there is very 
little the nation-state can do to prevent these processes taking their 
course. 
Some commentators, such as Lloyd have an 
optimistic outlook: TNC's must begin to consider the ethics and morality 
of their businesses, and move towards a position of 'corporate 
statesmanship'. But although the power of TNC's may have been a 
significant factor in advancing human rights, there may be a 'darker' 
side to the role of TNC's, where profit is valued above other concerns. 
The phrase 'post-national' has already been 
mentioned but now merits further examination. Commentators like 
Soysal (1996), believe that we have now entered a 'post-national' 
phase of citizenship, although, as Raphael (1991) has noted, 
international law, can be frustrated by national law, if the nation chooses 
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to simply ignore any directives. To this extent then the nation-state is 
still a significant force. 
Strange (1995), has pointed out another 
phenomena, which she refers to as the 'asymmetries of power'. She 
makes particular reference to the USA, and believes, that whilst the 
USA has had to cede power in the face of globalisation, many smaller 
nation-states, have had to cede power to globalisation and the USA. 
Which leads to the consideration that not all nation-states are at the 
same point, some are weaker than others, whilst some such as the 
USA appear to be as strong as ever. Though however strong or weak 
a nation-state is, there are arguments that 'difference' must be an 
important issue. As Lister (1997) argues, the power of the nation-state 
may have been curtailed, but that does not mean it is not still a major 
force in shaping the nature of citizenship. She believes that an active 




Europe and cit izenship. 
As the previous chapter has shown, the nation-
state, whilst undoubtedly under pressure from globalisation, is still a 
strong contender for shaping citizenship rights. Arguably, as this 
chapter will discuss, the impact of supra-national bodies such as the 
'European Union' have helped to strengthen national identity, and thus 
within the Union, there has been much discussion about who should be 
considered to be a citizen of the Union by virtue of being a citizen of a 
nation-state. 
The 'European issue' is undoubtedly extremely 
complex, and whilst the nation states have their own notions of 
citizenship, the varying layers within Europe, local, national and supra-
national also have their own versions of the nature of citizenship. 
Therefore is it really possible for the 'European Union' to develop a 
universalistic concept of citizenship, or will the Union have to appreciate 
that the way forward is to accept that the people of the Union have 
differing needs which will have to be addressed in order for the Union to 
be successful? 
Milward and Sorensen, (1994), argue that part 
of the problem Europe now faces stems from an inaccurate account of 
European history. They contend that much of Europe's recent history 
has been dominated by the notion that Europe is moving towards 
further integration, and the "nation-state inescapably had to enter into a 
network of international functional institutions", (1994: 2). The thrust of 
their argument is that far from being redundant, the nation-state has 
always retained power. 
Europe has had a turbulent history, and in 
Vaclav Havel's opinion will have a turbulent future unless decisions are 
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made about the nature of citizenship and belonging. In an article in 
Time Magazine' of the 4th November 1996, Havel argued that unless 
Europe begins to act like a community and provide a stable modus 
vivendi for the people of Europe, then "the idea of a Europe of peaceful 
diversity risks.... falling into the hands of a cast of fools, fanatics, 
populists and demagogues, waiting for their chance to promote the 
worst European traditions", (1996: 37) 
At the same time, many of the recent problems 
facing Europe come from the collapse of artificially constructed states 
such as the former Yugoslavia. Communism in this case provided the 
modus vivendi, until communism collapsed and Yugoslavia was riven 
apart. Therefore is it sensible to try and weld together such diverse 
nations into a 'super-state'? Is it sensible to ignore the differences 
between states, or even between the smaller regional units? In order to 
understand the future for Europe, we therefore need to understand its 
past. As Cesarani and Fulbrook note, "many of these ethnic and 
national conflicts are historically rooted, which underlines the need for 
an historical perspective to the current fluid and bewildering state of 
citizenship and nationality", (1996: 7). 
This chapter will therefore discuss the issue of 
the relationship between Europe and the 'Nations', is it the case for 
example that the quest for European citizenship has provoked a 
nationalist backlash? Finally this chapter will give an insight into how the 
three strata's of region, nation and Europe may be successfully 
integrated - where 'difference' is acknowledged - but with each strata 
bolstering citizenship and providing concentric rings of identity, so 
citizenship can become an anchor, an insurance against the potentially 
anomic arousing features of globalisation. 
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Citizenship and MaiftgoinaiBnsinni 
The 'Observer' of the 9th February 1997 gave 
details about the mayoral campaign being ran by Catherine Megret. The 
heading of the article was "French, fascist and proud of the fight". 
Further in the article, somebody is quoted as saying, "I am not racist, 
but I am French". In the grand plan of life, the subsequent election 
victory of a fascist would not necessarily be too disturbing. In Britain, the 
'National Front* gained control of the 'Isle of Dogs'. However, victory 
was short lived, and it was not long before an effective opposition was 
mobilised and the National Front was ousted. 
However, what is concerning is the aftermath 
left by such blatant displays of racism. As a serious political force, the 
'National Front' is of little significance, but one asks for how long can 
this situation be maintained? Megret's protestations proffer reasons why 
there has been a decline in people's standards of living. Her argument 
is simple and logical, if there are insufficient resources to go around, 
then get rid of the excess baggage, in this case 'foreigners'. 
Migration though, within Europe is not 
something which is a recent phenomena, Europe has always historically 
played host to a plethora of people from diverse corners of the world. 
What is problematic is why, when during the middle of this century, a 
war was fought to eliminate Fascism, we are now seeing a 
reoccurrence of the very thing so many people wished to destroy. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why Fascism has 
seemingly reappeared, (though there is scepticism as to whether 
fascism did disappear or merely laid dormant), could have to do with the 
construction of the European Union. Much weight has been given to 
who belongs to the Union. Ironically this has also meant that there has 
been a re-examination of who does not belong. So whilst there have 
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been talks of the removal of border controls within Europe -
schengenland - there have been other discussions on tightening the 
borders of Europe per se. This would have the effect of turning the 
community into 'Fortress Europe', and would also help to placate the 
fears of those who believe a flood of immigration is imminent. 
The 'Maastricht Treaty' (1991), which 
essentially embraces the tenets of free market capitalism, has as part of 
the 'Treaty', left the question of citizenship to the nation-states to decide. 
In other words, rather than developing a coherent policy of who belongs 
in the community, there is still the sense of the idea of citizenship being 
piecemeal and haphazard. Meehan (1994), describes how the 'Single 
European Act' of 1986, did have some content pertaining to the social 
implications of the internal market. However, although the need to have 
social rights was acknowledged, they were never included in the 'Act'. 
As Meehan describes, the social constitution of rights was rejected by 
some countries, (namely Britain) and therefore "to try to maintain 
consensus, it was agreed the Charter should not, itself, be legally 
binding, but should be a solemn declaration", (1994: 76). 
This meant that there was no legal weight 
behind social rights, and therefore the 'Single European Act' of 1986 
and the subsequent 'Maastricht Treaty' were primarily concerned with 
economic integration as opposed to social integration. This has the 
effect of making the concept of Europe an abstract rather than concrete 
idea. Money may be a cohesive factor in the fragmentary world of global 
economics, but monetary union alone cannot assist social stability, and 
whilst the social aspect of the European Union is neglected, then 
perhaps the ultra-right wing element found in society may gain further 
footing. 
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Harden (1996) points to further complications 
in the construction of 'Europe'. He argues that within Europe, identity is 
based on the relationship between the individual and the nation-state. 
However the nation-state developed more as an historical accident than 
something with true democratic foundations. He states that, 
"In modern Europe, political community and political identity 
are focused on the state. The states that exist are an arbitrary 
product of history rather than the result of acts of democratic 
will. War, marriage and bribery all played a part in their 
formation. These unpleasant facts are covered up by 
historical myths that are an important part of what is called 
'national identity'" (1996: 135). 
Therefore, by requesting that nation-states 
define their own citizenship policies, has meant that there has been a 
complete re-examination of what constitutes a citizen of a nation-state, 
and some old hostilities have seemingly been revived. Recently there 
has been what appears on the surface to be futile and silly debates over 
what is 'French' or 'English' in the popular media, but, in reality, these 
debates have been fuelling people's fears of being overrun by 
'foreigners' wishing to dilute the purity of their nation. Only recently, the 
'News of the World' of 16th February 1997, ran a story by Alan Clark, 
stating "Winnie's our answer to Euro-prats", the story went on to depict 
the problems of printing the potential new Euro-money. Unfortunately , 
this is quite an ordinary example of the level of debate surrounding 
European integration, and sadly not restricted to one nation. It is a pity 
that images of the second world war, which was principally fought to 
stop Fascism have been evoked decades later to promote nationalism. 
The language used by Madame Megret is also 
highly flammable, and again if we actually look closely at the language 
she uses, it parodies the language used in war-like situations. She 
states that, "France is in a state of emergency", (Guardian, 18.02.97, 
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p12, 1997). By her use of language she has immediately constructed an 
enemy. Within the same article, she attacks the culture of the enemy, 
thus extrapolating from this point, that anything which is not French is 
alien and unacceptable. 
The reunification of Germany also had 
ramifications for extreme nationalism. After reunification many East 
Germans flooded into West Germany. According to Fulbrook (1996), 
this was not such a major issue, as they were assimilated into West 
German society fairly smoothly. This was probably due to the policy of 
'jus sanguines', where, as discussed earlier, to be a German citizen 
does not necessarily mean you have to be born on German soil, as long 
as you were born to German parents. Those migrating from East to 
West consequently were granted the legal status of being a German 
citizen automatically. 
Even though German reunification was costly, 
in terms of absorbing East into West, this was a very successful project. 
Arguably, this was because the German identity had been maintained 
during the cold war period, and now because the two parts of the 
country have been reunited they have good reason to celebrate their 
identity. They could be proud of their nationality without constantly 
having to monitor the situation regarding the war, as to many Germans, 
the war is not a part of their history, they do not constantly have to hang 
their heads in shame and apologise for being a German, they do not 
carry with them the collective guilt of their ancestors. 
However, even though younger Germans want 
to bury firmly the spectre of the war, their history is still being 
scrutinised by other countries. This is still helping to maintain the image 
of Germany as a bellicose nation. This suggests that in the European 
context, nations do not really have a full understanding of each others 
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problems; they are still caught up in categorising nations based on 
stereotypes. 
Chancellor Kohl must be given credit for the 
way he has conducted Germany's relationship with the rest of Europe. 
He has not constantly played the 'race-card', and has tried to provide 
Germany with both a national identity buried within a European identity. 
As Middlemas states, "the phrase 'European Germany', [has been] 
assiduously propagated since 1990 by the Kohl Government", (1997: 
28). 
John Major, unlike Margaret Thatcher, also 
never directly took advantage of the race issue within Europe. A speech 
given in India and recorded in 'The Times' of 10th January 1997, 
appeared to be sincere and dealt with the despair of racism in a positive 
and constructive manner. Unfortunately though, whilst Kohl and Major 
(and now Blair) seem intent on publicly berating racism, their 
governments are still actively producing a racist governmental agenda. 
For example, in May 1993, the German Government brought in laws to 
restrict immigration into Germany, and in Britain, the 'Asylum Act' was a 
blatant attempt to play to those who fear Britain will be over-run by 
mass immigration. 
There are confusing signals being issued, and 
if the situation is not treated with caution, there may be a problem of 
credibility with the European Union. Will it stand for racial tolerance and 
tolerance of 'difference', or will it stand for intolerance of anything not 
construed as European, and if European integration remains solely on a 
fiscal and not social level, then the probability will be that Europe will 
remain divided, with the market driving an 'I'm all right Jack' mentality. 
Of course some countries have used the 
mechanism of introspection in a positive way. An example of this is Eire. 
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Eire can now establish an identity amongst the other European 
countries, and not solely in respect of its relationship to Britain, as the 
Irish President Mary Robinson stated about joining the European Union, 
"In fact, joining gradually made a deep and positive impact on our 
Irishness. Ireland welcomed the chance to express its European 
connection. We were reclaiming our place in Europe", (Time, Winter 
1996, p121). 
It does appear that Ireland has managed 
successfully to reconcile its sense of national identity with a European 
identity, a situation which has seemingly eluded nations such as 
Germany and Britain. Whilst people are in a state of confusion as to 
who they are, and their place in the world, it is possible that racism is a 
defensive act, and a reflex to the perception of being under threat. 
Chances are, those of us who are content with ourselves are more 
likely to be content with the idea of diversity. If people do not feel under 
attack, then people are more likely to be amenable to differing cultures. 
Presently though, people do feel at risk. And 
not necessarily from the process of globalisation per se. Britain, 
because we have simply joined the European Union for economic 
reasons and have, to date, rejected social integration with our European 
neighbours, has managed to become the 'sweat shop' of Europe, thus 
German businesses are being seduced by our low pay, low social cost 
ethos, and are relocating their businesses from Germany to Britain. As 
Marsh states, "German companies during the past two years have 
invested more in the UK than in any other country in the world", (1996: 
25). 
The effect of maintaining the flow of inward 
investment into Britain means that British workers now have to accept 
reduced pay and reduced standards of working conditions. Britain has 
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also, like its European partners had to keep its economic house in order 
to keep in line with the demands of the 'Maastricht Treaty'. This has 
meant the welfare state, has come under attack with all the concomitant 
social dislocation caused by the erosion of welfare services. Meanwhile, 
Germany, with its excellent social and economic record since the 
second world war, is also suffering. Germany did take an economic 
battering on reunification, and the Bundesbank is now in a weakened 
state. It is probably only a matter of time before it is forced to follow the 
same route as Britain, and begin to dismantle some of its social 
institutions. 
And this is where we came in. With new social 
problems coming to the surface as a result of unemployment it is 
always possible to blame 'foreign workers' for causing the loss of work 
amongst 'indigenous' workers. Moreover, because 'citizenship' is 
determined by the nation-states and is not a European 'entity', many 
guest workers find themselves in a vulnerable situation, particularly 
with regard to the strengthening electoral position of avowedly racist 
parties like the French 'National Front'. 
The 'guest' workers have had a 'raw deal'. 
Many were originally invited over to their host countries to swell the 
labour force. Many have contributed to the overall wealth of their host 
countries, and yet many have been denied the right to formal citizenship 
status. Of course, being given full citizenship rights, does not 
necessarily mean acceptance by the indigenous population. As 
Cesarani and Fulbrook note, "racist attacks are hardly prefaced with a 
polite query as to the victims legal status", (1996: 225). 
However, it has been shown in the case of the 
merging of East and West Germany, that the granting of full citizenship 
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makes integration far less difficult. To quote from Cesarani and 
Fulbrook again: 
"Whatever the differences of culture, dialect, religion or 
economy, if immigrants are accepted by host communities as 
having a legitimate claim to belonging, their integration is 
infinitely less problematic than if the differences are construed 
as insurmountable barriers to a sense of common humanity", 
(1996: 216). 
This idea is advanced by Meehan (1994), who 
believes that if citizenship is principally viewed as a legal status, then 
integration within the European Union will be more attainable, but if it is 
seen as being linked to the concept of gemeinschaft, then integration 
will be impeded. Gemeinschaft, by its very nature, is built upon 
homogeneity, and therefore anything which is different will be seen as 
being 'outside', diversity is not something which is embraced. Thus the 
assimilation of foreign or guest workers will be made more difficult, and 
the parameters of the nation-state will become less permeable, as each 
state will cling to its own version of what constitutes 'English', 'French' or 
whatever. Whilst not wishing to undermine the nation-state, citizenship 
should be developed as a coherent European issue and not left to each 
nation-state to decide. 
To achieve this goal, the European Union must 
look further than economic and monetary integration, and develop a 
social policy which transcends nation-state boundaries, and is not 
simply confined to the workplace as at present. European Union should 
be built on policies of fairness, diversity and acceptance, as this is the 
only way forward to guarantee that the ghost of war will be exorcised 
forever. As Liebfried (1994) states, 
"When we observe the EU's 'social dimension' today we 
quickly hit on the basic question: what is the EU's actual 
capacity for integration?.... In todays EU 12, and more is to 
come, these combined societal structures seem to be 
gradually destabilized. They shrink slowly, turning into islands 
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in the rougher Common Market sea. But in place of the 
destroyed social fabric no new European 'social pact' has 
surfaced", (1994: 252) 
That said, there are commentators such as 
Tassin (1992), who recommend that the nation-state is destroyed and 
that Europe should consider breaking down into autonomous regional 
units. His ideas about regionalism will be examined next. 
The Regions and Europe 
The debate about regional identity has been 
brought to the fore recently, in part due to the fact that, with further 
European integration, many regions can now by-pass the nation-state 
and deal directly with the European Union. The process of globalisation 
also directly impacts upon our lives. Chances are, that even in the most 
remote comer of the world, local cultures have been subjected to 
outside influences, and as Giddens (1997) believes, "there's an 
increasing connection between local life and global change", (1997: 18). 
This leaves a question mark hanging over 
supra-national bodies such as the EU, as lately confusion has arisen 
over what its prime function will be. Moreover, will the EU render the 
nation-state anachronistic? Within this section then, the idea of being 
able to set up regional units with the power to deal directly with the 
supra-national body of the European Union will be discussed. Thus, 
again, this thesis must discuss the death of the nation-state, though this 
time its death will not be because of the process of globalisation per se, 
but because the nation-state can be broken into autonomy seeking 
regions. 
Tassin (1992), has so far during research for 
this thesis proved to be the most radical apropos the functions and uses 
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of regional power, therefore it is his work which will provide the 
underpinning for the debate on regional power. 
Tassin's position is whether harmony within the 
European Union will ever be tenable within the present structure of 
nation-states acting in concert with each other. Tassin argues that true 
harmony, when considering the history of Europe was only ever realised 
during the period of the Roman Empire, when the whole of Europe was 
under the jurisdiction of Rome, and we has a form of commonality of 
cultures, because we had a shared religion. 
Tassin then argues that the next significant 
point in the history of Europe was the battle for hegemony amongst the 
nation-states. The nation-states, he argues, were not particularly 
interested in forming an empire, but were intent on gaining imperialistic 
control, via the use of armed conflict, and this has been the case, 
continuing to the last world war. 
However, Tassin argues that during this period, 
there has been some resistance to the notion of Europe being simply a 
set of nations intent on war-mongering. He believes Europe should 
evolve into a federation, and it is only by recognising this, that peace 
and prosperity will be realised. He quotes Proudhon as saying that, "the 
twentieth century will usher in the era of federations, or else humanity 
will again embark upon a thousand-year purgatory", (1992: 181). 
For Tassin, the road Europe must follow is to 
recognise regional power, and to encourage active participation of 
citizens within the regional framework. This is akin to the idea of 
citizenship purported by the Greeks, where citizens had to be active 
within the Polis. This form of human contact, is, Tassin argues, truly 
cohesive. People can identify with their local communities, they can 
share power, and care about each other. Their identity is not subsumed 
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by the foreboding shadow of the nation-state. Within the context of 
regions, people can exercise true citizenship, they will have to be dutiful, 
as they have the power to shape the very existence of their 
communities. 
Tassin relies on an almost Durkheimian sense 
of organic solidarity. The community is not something born out of 
tradition nor simply because it covers a certain geographical location. A 
community for Tassin is something which can transcend the prescribed 
state boundaries. In fact, this idea of a community being organic rather 
than prescribed is quite central to Tassin's debate. He states, for 
example, that, 
"This elective dimension cannot be stressed enough. Europe 
can be reborn only if possibilities are created for a human 
community, which is no longer defined, like the old nation, by 
frontiers, physical contours or civil status, but rather in terms 
of social, cultural or spiritual goals - communities which I shall 
accordingly call elective, as opposed to the old native 
communities", (1992:184). 
Tassin, in essence wants to render the nation-
state as obsolete. He believes that the concept of the nation-state has 
rendered the idea of the active citizen as useless, what would in the 
active life of the Greek Polis, have been carried out by the citizen has 
been taken over by the apparatus of the nation-state. 
By locating power within the smaller regional 
unit, power can be once again be brought down to the 'human' level. 
However, Tassin is aware that regions need to develop relationships 
with other regions. He envisages the European Union as the 
mechanism for forging harmonious relationships between the regional 
groups. He wants to see a European identity established, one which 
transcends the boundaries of nation-states. By producing a European 
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identity, a true European citizen can be formed, one which is not 
shackled to the narrow confines of the nation-state boundary. 
Tassin is of course not the only commentator 
who believes there has to be a fundamental change in how citizenship 
is viewed. Cesarani and Fulbrook (1996), have identified, what is 
considered by them to be a trend towards the un-coupling of rights from 
national identity. They argue that global pressures are militating against 
the nation-state and are piercing its boundaries, forcing a 
reassessment of the concept of citizenship - though this debate has 
been considered in earlier chapters. 
Tassin's premise that the way forward for 
Europe lies in developing regional identities is persuasive, and is 
extolled by key political figures. Recognising a growing dissent within 
the body of the nation-state, calls for devolution have been made, an 
example of this is the call for Scottish devolution. Scotland, it is argued, 
needs an independent Scottish Parliament, and furthermore needs to 
have these needs articulated within the structure of the European 
Union, rather than be represented as part of the United Kingdom. 
There has to be, some argue, a full Scottish Parliament, as opposed to 
a Scottish Assembly, as the Scottish Assembly would still be ultimately 
answerable to Westminster and not the people of Scotland who it 
purports to represent. 
However, calls for devolution do not 
necessarily mean the death-knell for the nation-state. Many who extol 
the virtues of devolution, such as Dennis Healey (1996), are not 
necessarily as radical as Tassin, and wish to keep the regions under 
the aegis of the nation-state. It is hoped by using the process of 
subsidiarity, where pushing decisions down to their lowest level, will 
enable citizens to act with sufficient autonomy without the need to 
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dismantle the nation-state, however the process of subsidiarity will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
An emphasis on regionality, it is also hoped, 
will give people a chance to develop a collective identity. It will enable 
people to make sense of their lives and belong to something tangible 
when everything else appears to be fragmenting. If however as Tassin 
suggests, regional identities are based not on tradition, but on an 
amalgam of spiritual and cultural resources, then the stability of the 
regions will be guaranteed. This is because, the people living within the 
regions will have been able to make a reflexive choice about their 
identity. People themselves will have been instrumental in shaping their 
identity, rather than having something imposed upon them. 
Although the argument for regionalism is very 
seductive, it is not without problems. The ability to construct our own 
identities reflexively, implies that we can reflexively construct the 
identities of others. If Italy is used as an example, regional identity in the 
North was built upon constructing an 'alien' identity for those in the 
South. Those in the South were effectively cast as the 'other'. The myth 
of the 'other' was exacerbated by the popular press, they constantly 
gave media coverage to the idea of a 'them and us' situation. The 
images, kept alive this process, and new demons were constantly 
manufactured. As Ruzza and Schmidtke state, "These episodes, and 
the process of public re-interpretation and mythologisation surrounding 
them, form an important source for an ongoing construction of social 
boundaries", (1996: 192). 
In part, the situation has arisen because the 
European Union has consistently by-passed the nation-states and 
encouraged regional development (Cesarani & Fulbrook: 1996). By the 
same token, the European Union has also been instrumental in 
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encouraging a regional identity, and has, by giving regions a certain 
amount of economic autonomy, militated against a cohesive nation-
state. In effect, what has happened in Italy is that the European Union 
has probably - albeit unknowingly - promoted factionalism (Ruzza & 
Schmidtke: 1996). 
It can also be the case, that both nationalism 
and 'regionalism', share similar characteristics, both work to determine 
their own identity by defining the 'other'. Hutton, in an article in the 
'Observer' of the 15th September 1996, warns against Europe turning 
into a "babel of selfish regional nationalisms", (1996: 26). He points out 
correctly that the new identities being formed in the regions have more 
to do with financial rather than cultural reasons. The Lega Nord 
principally wants to declare itself the independent 'State of Padania', 
because it no longer wishes to be tied to other regions in Italy, which 
are poor. Italy is not the only nation-state under attack from self-centred 
regions. Majorca in Spain, as well as there being calls for the break-up 
of Belgium and Holland, mainly because the regions within these 
countries wishing to gain independence are affluent regions, and resent 
paying taxes to support the poorer regions within their countries. 
In contrast to Tassin, regions can be just as 
determined as nation-states to maintain their boundaries. Tassin 
appears to be almost Utopian in his desire for regional autonomy at the 
cost of ignoring the fact that people can be just as possessive about the 
parameters of their region - be these territorial, linguistic or 'cultural' as 
they can be of the boundaries of their countries. 
One can also argue the case that if nation-
states are allowed to break into autonomous regional units, then the 
differences between regions may be quite marked. It may be the 
situation where there will be work poor and resource poor regions next 
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to those which are resource and work rich. Attempts could be made to 
prevent such a development by a supra-national body such as the 
European Union, but there is a danger that such a body may be too 
remote from the regions or the bureaucracy involved may be too 
unwieldy to maintain inter-regional stability. 
It may also be the case, that people may not 
want to see the end of the nation-state, and the nation-state could 
provide a cohesive quality between regions. However, if regional units 
can be encouraged within the boundaries of the nation-state, with the 
nation-state itself integrated within 'Europe', then in effect, multi-layers 
of identity could be created, securing social cohesion and not social 
dislocation. 
Supra-national, National and Sub-national Can They Co-exist? 
Undoubtedly the nation-state is under assault 
from globalising forces and regional ambitions, however this thesis has 
argued that to declare that the nation-state is now simply a 'figure head' 
is fallacious, and that although as shown in chapter two, human rights 
do at times supersede citizenship rights, the nation-state does still, and 
indeed should be a key player in offering protection to the individual. 
This section will therefore provide a way 
forward in which the differing needs of region, nation and the European 
Union can be articulated in a harmonious way, instead of what seems at 
times to be an openly antagonistic relationship displayed between the 
three tiers of authority. 
Within Europe it is increasingly difficult to 
define citizenship along the lines of nationality, as mass migration has 
altered the ethnic and national composition of most of Europe, whereas 
during the formation of the European nation-states this was not the 
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case. As Turner notes, the European states "were relatively 
homogenous in ethic terms", (1993: 59). As discussed earlier, the issue 
of immigration and who belongs within Europe has now seemingly 
unleashed a tide of petty nationalism, and whilst Europe seems to 
concentrate purely on economic integration at the expense of social 
integration, then perhaps we will receive a Europe we deserve. As 
noted in Time Magazine', of the 23rd June 1997, 
"A European Union whose sole objective is the euro - and a 
euro whose sole attributes in the minds of the people are 
austerity and social suffering - would be the ideal feeding 
ground for far-right anti-immigrant parties like France's 
National Front", (1997: 30). 
As noted within the same article, many Europeans are now fearful of 
having their jobs sacrificed at the altar of monetary union. One of the 
main fears expressed is that if Europe continues down the road it is 
taking then there could be a situation where Europe will be made up of 
work rich and work poor areas, as one commentator is quoted as 
saying "Economic Europe doesn't mean much if you are excluded 
through joblessness", (1997: 27). 
So how can this problem be addressed? 
Freeman and Soete (1994) believe the problem of joblessness, has 
arisen within the European Union because the member states have 
adopted a policy of 'negative integration'. The adoption of free trade, 
has deregulated and de-stablised existing economic structures 
particularly the commitment to full employment, with consequent social 
dislocation. Freeman and Soete therefore maintain that the States of 
Europe should be trying to achieve a position of positive integration, 
where there is an adherence to a 'social charter*. They argue that "free 
trade in this social deregulation sense has undoubtedly a negative 
connotation. The benefits of trade should lead to better international 
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allocation of resource thus increasing welfare at world level", (1994: 
164). 
Teague and Grahl (1990) argue that the social 
charter is perceived as being a sign of positive integration between the 
member states of the European Union, a safeguard written into the 
initiative for monetary union to balance against the possible turbulence 
of the free market. However, there was a disagreement as to whether 
such an agreement could be reached, as this was considered to be a 
move towards federalism at a time when further integration was being 
resisted, especially by the British. As Teague and Grahl note "it was 
questioned whether such an essentially federal arrangement as a social 
constitution could be adopted by the community, a pre-federal body" 
(1991:212). 
Cook (1996) argues that social provision must 
go hand in hand with open markets. He is also an advocate of the social 
charter, seeing it as an imperative to guard against the ravages of 
unemployment, he states, 
"as we move to open markets we must do so in a way that 
maintains standards of social provision. That's why the 
European Social Chapter is so important, not because of what 
it says in itself but because it's one of the first attempts by an 
international community to reach a minimum standard of 
social provision" (1996: 17). 
Tindale (1996) also argues about the importance of adopting the 'Social 
Charter'. He accredits Delors with the idea of the 'Social Charter', and 
goes on to argue that unless the member states of the Union accept a 
common standard for social protection then there is a good chance that 
some member states with low social costs will attract investment, but 
that will be detrimental for all the other member states, thus eventually 
all the member states will be potential areas of falling social provision. 
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The question that now begs answering is what 
protection can the 'Social Charter' afford to the citizens of Europe? A 
recent article in 'The Observer' of 11th May 1997, gave details of the 
implications of the 'Social Chapter'. Whilst acknowledging that many 
employers and employees see the charter as simply a talking shop or a 
prelude to industrial havoc, others see the charter in very positive 
terms, especially the setting up of the works councils, where companies 
must now consult elected members of their workforce to discuss key 
issues of company policy. Trade unions, according to this article, whilst 
having some misgivings have been largely involved with the works 
councils. As well as the works councils, the 'Social Charter', according 
to this article, includes provision for a minimum wage, leave from work 
to care for young children, a maximum working week and recognition of 
trade unions. 
What is problematic is that although the 'Social 
Charter' appears to be of some significance for the workers of Europe, 
there is no provision in the charter for non-workers, and as Goldblatt 
and Held (1997) point out, many problems that have arisen in Britain 
are actually shared by our European partners. They state that 
"some problems that Blair will face are peculiar to Britain, but 
four are common to all European Social Democrats: sluggish, 
jobless growth; the mounting threat of environmental crisis 
and the steady erosion of the social and environmental fabric 
are the backdrop to all mature capitalist economies", (1997: 
24). 
Rhodes (1996) argues that the needs of the 
citizens of Europe are in flux, and calls into question the basis of welfare 
provision. He argues that the demographic changes occurring within 
Europe such as the emergence of differing family forms and an 
increasingly aging society are "altering the gender/family/work nexus in 
which western welfare states have traditionally been based" (1996: 
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301). Rhodes, however, perceives a general malaise on the part of the 
European Union to any sort of supra-national welfare state, but he does 
acknowledge that some sort of protection is offered to the citizen via the 
European Court of Justice, (ECJ). The ECJ has acted to ensure that 
welfare benefits are made available to claimants from all of the member 
states of the Union. 
Vobruba (1995) argues, perhaps contentiously 
that the European Union needs to have a strong social security system 
in order to become economically strengthened. He believes the two are 
intrinsically linked, as in order to exercise flexibility of approach we need 
to have in place a system which encourages employment stability, good 
health and high educational standards. He believes that, 
"the economic strength of the European model (even if 
perhaps concealed right now) are also based on - in 
comparative terms - high standards of social security. The 
fact is that social security is a precondition for flexibility", he 
believes firmly in the "economic value of social policy", (1995: 
307). 
Vobruba further discusses how the 
implementation of a European wide social policy is an economic as well 
as a social imperative. At present the problem with European social 
policy is that it is stymied by the nation-state. The nation-state still has 
the power to halt any sort of supra-national social policy, another 
problem is as mentioned earlier, social integration appears fixated with 
the notion that a citizen is a worker. As Vobruba states "European 
integration policy has, for historically obvious reasons a strong tendency 
to reduce citizens to employees", (1995: 312). Therefore social policy as 
a European issue must also address the non-worker as much as the 
worker, otherwise the risk of an emergent 'underclass' may become 
increasingly real, with implications for citizenship. 
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It was mentioned above that the nation-state 
appears to be in an almost antagonistic position to the making of EU 
policy. As discussed in previous chapters the nation-state is still very 
much a force to be reckoned with, but also the nation-state, as the 
introduction to this section implies, can and indeed should be involved 
in providing protection and security to its citizens. Europe is a collection 
of very different cultures and ethnicities. As Hall (1993) remarks, we all 
have very different histories - and it would be unwise to ignore history 
and try to join together people tempered by different histories - ignore 
Yugoslavia at our peril. 
Pocock (1990), believes we must always take 
into account the affection people have for the nation-state. He argues 
that "the desire for sovereignty is based on fundamental human needs, 
it will not go away. Deflecting it from its traditional focus in the nation-
state means finding a focus for it elsewhere", (1990: 324). Pocock 
warns against simply signing up the member states to a federalist future 
just because we want to have "geographical tidiness", (1990: 324) - as 
if countries making up a federal state have no common ground, the 
federation will soon fall apart. Yugoslavia was mentioned earlier; 
Pocock also reminds us of Russia and the constant tensions that exist 
within India. 
Pocock also observes that the European Union 
does not have a common language, nor does it share a common 
religion. The nation-state will need to be the arbiter between the citizens 
of the country it represents and the bureaucracy of the supra-national 
body. The nation-state undoubtedly needs to function as the middle tier 
of government as Guild (1996) suggests that many people do not even 
understand the concept of a European Union, let alone look to it to 
protect their needs. The nation-state in this case could act as a 'glue' 
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adhering the regions together, and a sensible tier of government to act 
as a mediator between region and Union. 
Teague and Grahl (1991) suggest that full 
integration of all systems would be an impossible task, as the labour 
markets and social welfare systems across the Union are far too 
diverse. They state, "it is now widely accepted that harmonisation is an 
impracticable and even undesirable policy goal, given the diversity of 
labour market institutions across the community", (1991: 218). The 
European Union though, could provide a modus vivendi for the citizens 
of Europe, but it could be the function of the nation-state to 'translate' 
any directives from Europe and taper them to suit the circumstances of 
its people, taking into account such things as culture, language, history 
and differing labour markets. 
One must also remember, as this chapter 
began, that feelings of national belonging are deeply entrenched -
almost lodged in the individual 'psyche'. It would be foolish to ignore or 
underestimate the strong psychological influence of the nation state. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, efforts to marginalise the nation-state have 
resulted in increasing 'Euro-sceptism', which on occasion has displayed 
Facist tendencies. 
There also needs to be more people involved 
in the political process, and local government is perhaps best placed for 
this. A sense of belonging is arguably very important, and participation 
in local democratic processes which work in harmony with the national 
and supra-national tiers will probably provide the most effective way of 
dealing with 'difference'. The next section will therefore look at the role 
of local government, and the importance of the civic bond. 
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Why is Local Government and th@ Civic Bond important? 
So the next question to be answered, is why is 
the civic bond so important? Kymlicka and Norman (1994), have 
identified four perspectives on citizenship. First, 'the left and 
participatory democracy', whose adherents believe in local 
empowerment, and the general decentralisation of state power; second, 
'civic republicanism', which is akin to the Athenian notion of citizenship, 
and advocates the direct involvement in public life: third, 'civil society 
theorists', who believe in the value of voluntarism, and argue that 
voluntary groups teach people to be virtuous, and accept that they have 
a responsibility for the wider community. Lastly, 'liberal virtue theory' 
theorists maintain that in a 'democratic' society, individuals cannot 
simply make demands, but must be willing to enter into open and frank 
debate with fellow citizens whose needs they may consider repugnant 
at worst or strange at best. In each case a rather different balance is 
struck between rights and responsibilities. 
Whilst noting that the above descriptions are 
very brief, they do give an insight into the complexities of the citizenship 
debate and the arguments surrounding the citizen as both a rights 
claimer and a dutiful person. Perhaps the most vociferous exponent of 
this debate is Amitai Etzioni. Etzioni (1995), argues that more 
commitment to building communities will be achieved by strengthening 
the civic tie. He equates participation in public life with rebuilding 
'communities', and states that, 
"the more opportunities we provide of both kinds to allow 
people to apply their civic commitment, the more powerful it 
will grow to be, and the more the moral and social order will 
be carried by the community rather than the state", (1995: 
160). 
Etzioni's notion of citizenship is very much tied 
to the notion of civic duty, and if civic duty is not carried out then he* 
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argues "the readings of social ill health are far too high for a civic 
society", (1995: X). Phillips, in a recent 'Observer' article of 03.08.97, 
also argues that more people should be involved with the political 
process, she worries that people have become removed from the 
political process, they are no longer involved with local politics and are 
estranged from national politics. She states "people have become 
dangerously alienated from the whole process of government." 
(Observer, 03.08.97, p4), and like Etzioni advocates a strengthening of 
local activity in order to strengthen community ties. 
The Structure of Local Government 
First, it is wise to remember that all the nation-
states within Europe have differing structures! For example, Derbyshire 
and Derbyshire (1989), point out that Germany has a strong tradition of 
decentralised authority, partly because, after the second world war, 
Germany was actively encouraged to embrace federalism as an active 
"check against the possible future abuse of central authority", (1989: 
17). They also argue that France, although not a federal state in the true 
sense (like Germany or the USA), has "elected regional governments 
with enhanced responsibilities and sources of finance", (1989: 19), 
whilst in Britain, 
"local authorities are entirely the creatures of parliament, 
which is controlled by the party in power, and dependent on 
central government not only for the bulk of their income but for 
their very existence. The abolition in 1986, of a whole tier of 
local government, the Metropolitan County Council, including 
the Greater London Council (GLC), is evidence of the 
disproportionate distribution of power in the United Kingdom", 
(1989: 20). 
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The Sfcat® of Locai Government in Britain 
Mulgan (1996), believes it is a sad indication of 
the sterility of the British system, that after the collapse of communism, 
"not one of the new democracies that emerged out of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union choose to follow Britain. For them the models were the 
USA and France, Germany and Spain", (1996: 220). So what is it that 
Britain is doing so wrong? Arguably by having such a strong centralised 
state, the ethos of citizenship is damaged. Participatory democracy is 
not tenable under these circumstances. As Smith (1996) notes 
Governments will simply work for the 'common good' and not attempt to 
encompass the notion of 'difference'. He states that "a number of 
factors... may undermine local government and local democracy, 
especially centralisation... formalistic participation, skewed 
representation... and official attitudes" (1996: 163). Marquand (1996) 
believes, that in Britain since 1945, the layer of government between 
the individual and the state has steadily been eroded - with dire 
consequences. He states "in the last fifty years, however, the 
intermediate institutions of civil society have steadily lost autonomy... As 
a result British local government is probably the weakest in the 
democratic world", (1996: 72/72). Mulgan also shares this view, he 
states, "more than most countries, Britain has a notoriously weak local 
government", (1996: 224). 
Selbourne (1994), argues that the civic bond 
must be strengthened and citizens must once again be prepared to 
participate in performing civic duties. Selbourne recognises that in this 
country, the civic bond has taken a battering. He states that, 
"Today, the civic order as a citizen-body can barely lay claim 
in the corrupted liberal orders... its ethical status and practical 
authority usurped 'from above' by supra-national 
bureaucracies and state apparatuses, and 'from below' by the 
undermining of the civic bond", (1994: 40). 
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What appears to have been happening of late, is that many decisions 
are being made about local services by unelected bodies. As Rustin 
(1997) notes , 
"Power has mostly been transferred from imperfectly 
democratic public bodies, to considerably less representative 
private ones... Meanwhile the elected local authorities who 
had previously had statutory control over these institutions 
were denied even a right of representation on the governing 
bodies" (1997: 79). 
So, to sum up before moving the debate 
further, within Britain it has been argued that the 'civic bond' has been 
severely damaged. Unlike many of our European neighbours, (such as 
Germany and France), we have a weak system of local government. It 
has been shown that the decline in the 'civic bond' has been mourned 
by commentators such as Marquand and Selbourne, because they see 
the situation as being instrumental in eroding the democratic process. 
Meanwhile, Etzioni believes that the civic bond needs to be repaired, 
simply because as people we have a need to form interdependent 
relationships, to form communities, where the local citizen body is active 
in promoting democratic principles. 
What Form Should Local Democracy Take? 
Mulgan (1996) and Milne (1996) discuss the 
relative'merits of 'citizen juries'. This is where a cross section of the 
local population is recruited to debate issues pertaining to, for example, 
planning and NHS matters. It is hoped by having citizen juries, that 
there is an element of consultation between those in power and the 
local populace. However, as Milne states "so far, citizen's juries do not 
have a good record of effecting change", (1996: 8). She further 
describes how eventually a member of a citizen jury will metamorphose 
into an 'expert', and thus be subject to the same lobbying techniques 
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normally reserved for members of parliament, thus negating the 
"dream... of an Athenian style democracy which is small-scale and 
uncontaminated", (1996: 9). Citizen juries could also undermine the 
notion of local democracy. They may be selected because they satisfy 
the statistical representation required, for instance, the jury may be 
balanced correctly in terms of class, ethnicity and gender, but the jury is 
still not an elected body, therefore how can they be held responsible for 
any decisions made? Marquand (1996) believes that, 
"the right response to the gathering crisis of community is to 
adopt the old 'Christian Democratic" principle of subsidiarity -
the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest level 
of government appropriate to the decision concerned", (1996: 
77). 
However, subsidiarity does have its opponents. 
Teasdale (1993), states that historically subsidiarity was linked with 
federalism, as in the case of the USA and Germany. In relation to some 
countries in the Union, subsidiarity was perceived as being a safeguard 
to the erosion of national sovereignty. Britain supported the notion , but 
only in so much as power was devolved from supra-national to national 
levels of government. The Conservative government, which was 
instrumental in negotiating the terms and wording of the 'Maastricht 
Treaty', was keen to fudge the real meaning of subsidiarity. As Teasdale 
notes^ "the references to subsidiarity in the new Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union proclaim the concept without defining it in a conclusive 
or definitive way" (1995: 190). Mainly this was due to the fear that the 
nation-state would fragment into autonomy seeking regions, who would 
demand the right to negotiate their own deals with the Union, thus 
turning whole of Europe into a federation. Now it appears that the 
process of subsidiarity is frequently perceived as being about relocating 
power from national to sub-national units, and about community 
empowerment, as discussed by Marquand but, as Teasdale states, 
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subsidiarity really concerns attempts to discover the correct level of 
government from supra-national to sub-national units;, it is not about 
shifting powers to enhance local communities. 
Phillips (1993), draws attention to the notion of 
consociationalism, which guarantees the economic, social and political 
rights of permanent minorities. However, she does question the power 
of consociationalism to effect change. Consociationalism is about 
keeping the peace rather that effecting change, and therefore does little 
to break down group barriers. As Phillips states "consociationalism is 
driven by the requirement of political stability... It accepts as more or 
less inevitable the continuing hostilities between such groups", (1993: 
17/18). 
So what should be the form of government at 
this level? Phillips acknowledges the attempts made by local 
government to represent minority groups. She discusses how certain 
attempts have been made at local level to try to give some 
representation to minority groups, and states that 
"in British politics, related questions have surfaced most 
directly in the numerous local government initiatives of the 
1980's which sought to establish some mechanism of 
representation for groups whose specific needs had been 
inadequately addressed. Thus the decision by many local 
authorities to establish women's committees or women's 
units, anti-racist committees or ethnic minorities units, or to 
appoint officers with special responsibilities for disadvantaged 
groups",(1993: 130/131). 
However, whilst such initiatives are laudable, 
as Phillips notes, they are soon scuppered by the argument of 
universalism - often portrayed as the 'common good', which negates 
any chance of further forays into pluralism. Of course by chanting the 
mantra of universalism, one should ask, who are the people wanting the 
'common good'? If there is a 'common good', then there must be 
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common morals and values, and therefore communities serviced by the 
'common good', could become exclusive enclaves, possibly only 
allowing admittance to those it deems will serve the 'common good'. In 
this sense there is a chance that 'common good' communities will 
evolve into nasty, petty little places, intolerant of anyone who cannot fit 
with the standards that have been set. An example of this has recently 
occurred in Jordan, Montana, USA, where a group decided to declare 
part of Montana 'Justus Township', (Guardian, 02.04.96). This group 
decided to form its own citizen body, and formulated its own set of laws 
which were that "white men have special rights above those of blacks 
and women - and a dollop of anti-semitism.... Then they rendered the lot 
into a hokey, latinate legalese and declared their independence", 
(Guardian, 02.04.96, p3). This example shows what should not happen, 
that is, that local government should take into account minority groups 
and that local government should never be above the laws of the land, 
communities and citizen bodies are important as a source of 
neighbourly interdependence, but they should not be declared a 'polity', 
they are not separate self-governing societies in their own right, they 
are part of society. 
Giddens (1996) believes we should therefore 
promote "dialogic democracy" (1996: 76). By this he means people 
being given the chance to voice their opinions and participate in 
decision making. He states that "it will often be the case that 
controversial issues cannot be directly resolved; yet discussion can 
allow us to agree to disagree and therefore be a powerful medium for 
tolerance and conciliation", (1996: 76). Hutton (1995) believes that the 
"public realm must be reclaimed", (1995: 290), and points to how there 
should be an overhaul of the current system of governance between the 
levels of local and national, where there should be more power drawn 
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from the centre, but that the recipients of such power should act in a 
more open and accountable way. He states that, "The devolution of 
power within lines of accountability must be clear... Instead on mini-
versions of the secret, centralised and powerful executive state they 
must become components of a more pluralistic society in which power 
is devolved away from the centre", (1995: 290). Williams (1981) also 
advocates a more open style of politics, where there is a full and frank 
exchange of ideas, she believes that national government must be 
prepared to devolve power to the lower tiers of government. Phillips 
(1993) maintains we should acknowledge a 'politics of difference', 
where difference is not merely something to be simply defended or 
represented, but difference is to be discussed, and should difference 
cause inequality, then changes must be made to counteract such 
inequalities. 
So, to sum up before up before moving to the 
final question of how can regional, national and supra-national layers of 
government be reconciled. Of late, local government within the UK has 
been progressively weakened and is therefore in need of urgent 
attention. The process of subsidiarity has been discussed, and whilst 
the British view of subsidiarity has thus far been about the relocation of 
power from supra-national to national government, subsidiarity must be 
embraced in it truest sense, and that is power must be devolved to 
locally elected bodies. That said, at the same time local government 
must become more transparent and inclusive, and must learn how to 
deal with difference, with a motivation to change direction and policy if 
inequality is encountered. This means a firm commitment to a policy of 
equal opportunity, as noted earlier consociationalism is fine, but it does 
little to effect change, it encourages a feeling of indignity within minority 
groups and essentially encourages a victim mentality. Generally , this 
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means there needs to be a financial commitment to the notion of equal 
opportunities. Local authorities need to have powers to raise money 
locally, and that means central government will have to trust local 
government to act responsibility, and get rid of 'capping'. As Richards 
states "the instinct of central government is nearly always not to trust 
the councils", (1997: 31) 
Conclusion 
As ever, within the British system of 
governance, Richards has noted, there is antagonism between local 
and national government. So how can there be a system which 
satisfies all tiers from sub to supra? The first point to note is, that all 
tiers of government are of equal importance, arguably in the scheme of 
life, the collection of household rubbish once a week will be as of equal 
importance to most people as discussions about the 'ERM', excepting 
the collection of rubbish is something that can be observed happening 
but discussions about 'ERM' are sometimes so convoluted as to be 
beyond comprehension. As local politics is about 'grass roots' issues, 
then it is possible to involve more people in the decision making 
process at this level. Local politics are, after all mainly about local 
issues, and as such can have the most impact upon people's lives. Also 
people may engage more with a process that they understand rather 
than the somewhat abstract issues debated at national and supra-
national levels. 
Another point to note, as Kymlicka and Norman 
(1994) believe, citizenship is not merely a status, it is an identity, 
inclusion in local citizenship projects provides another ring of identity, as 
stated, "Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity that would 
integrate previously excluded groups within British society and provide a 
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source of national unity", (1994: 369). The idea behind such a notion is 
that identities of locality, nation and supra-nation form concentric rings 
of identity, anchoring people, as Ascherson (1996) argues "children... 
imagine their concentric spreading rings of identity reaching out to all 
humanity and beyond" (1996: 95). 
In order to keep nationalistic tendencies at bay, 
there needs to be firstly a strengthening of European institutions. 
Europe needs to be bolstered to withstand global pressures. Europe 
also needs to strive for both financial and social stability, as ultimately 
the two are inextricably linked, secondly, the power of the nation-state 
must not be underestimated. As Pocock (1990) states, inevitably "we 
are left with the nation-state. This should not surprise us. The nation-
state has been around a long time, and presumably survived because it 
is the best means of meeting certain needs" (1990: 326). The nation-
state does have a very key role in providing citizenship rights, identity 
and provision, the nation-state provides a strong glue which can keep 
people 'secure'. And thirdly, the last tier of government, regional and 
local, though they must not, as discussed earlier, be considered inferior. 
Many of the services provided locally are of enormous significance, for 
example, within schools children can be encouraged to explore their 
own cultures and to share the process of exploration with others, it is 
perhaps, more probably at this level that we can achieve a 'politics of 
difference', where there is communication between groups, for 
example, politicians from national and supra-national bodies can come 
up with solutions to the troubles in Northern Ireland - in theory, but the 
real test will be if the local communities accept and implement change; 
for example, if local authorities cease discriminating against Catholic 
minorities for housing and other resources. It is possibly the case as 
Meehan (1994) suggests that we are now experiencing a 'different' form 
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of citizenship, where identities are not fixed but are overlapping. She 
states that, 
"a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national 
nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the 
identities, rights and obligations, associated... with citizenship, 
are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration 
of common Community institutions, states, national and 
transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of 
regions", (1994:1) 
However, it must be noted that probably out of 
the three tiers of authority, the nation-state as Pocock as stated earlier, 
is the most resilient. Although there has been many debates discussed 
within this thesis about the impotency of the nation-state, it is probably 
provides the most enduring quality. Consider British history: the 'Act of 
Union' of 1707 effectively dissolved government in Scotland, that was 
over three hundred years ago, but the essence of Scottishness still 
abounds today. In order to keep nationalism and potential civil unrest at 
bay, we cannot deny that the nation-state is of vital importance. 
Therefore we should be a member of the local citizen body, and have 
representation and discussion about what should happen locally. We 
should be citizens of the nation-state and ultimately we should be 
citizens of the larger unit of Europe. Meehan (1994) whilst noting the 
complexity of this situation also sees it as a challenge .She states that, 
"our political actions are now having to be carried out through 
a 'web of common institutions, states, regional and local 
authorities and voluntary associations on the domestic front 
and simultaneously, in nation and/or transnation alliance.... 
while the complexity of this framework is intimidating in the 
demands it makes... it can provide many openings for 
challenging authority, for expressing our various loyalties 
associated with our various identities and for exercising our 
rights and duties in more than one arena" (1994: 160/161). 
Let us all hope that Meehan is right. However, 
whilst she does seem to be relatively optimistic about the future, the 
next chapter will discuss whether there should be a reassessment of 
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the whole citizenship project, as citizenship defined by the terms of a 
liberal democracy has managed to curtail and sometimes exclude some 
groups of people, namely women. 
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4 
Exploring women and! cit izenship 
The examination of the relationship between 
women and citizenship has been deliberately kept as a separate 
chapter. The reasons underpinning this decision are because 
citizenship is discussed mainly in terms of its 'democratic foundations'. 
However as Pateman argues, democracy has little to do with the role of 
women, and more to do with keeping, "liberal society as a series of 
male clubs", (1990: 210). This argument has several champions. 
Phillips is quoted as stating, "liberal democracy has not served women 
well", (1992: 68), whilst Lister (1993), appreciates citizenship, although 
masquerading as gender-neutral, is far from being so. 
Williams (1993) argues that feminism 
questions the universality of citizenship. However, feminists are divided 
about the meaning and nature of the idea of citizenship, as citizenship in 
contemporary society is multi-faceted, and therefore varying theories 
around the theme of 'difference' are emerging. The first section of this 
chapter will therefore consider the problems citizenship within a liberal 
democracy poses for women, whilst the second section will consider the 
contribution feminism can make towards a clearer understanding of the 
nature of citizenship, bearing in mind , that women cannot be treated as 
an homogenous mass, and that this debate is intersected by issues 
such as class and race, as any contemporary notions of citizenship 
must consider these issues. 
The Problems Liberal Democracy Poses for Feminism. 
This section will argue that universalistic 
approaches to citizenship actively undermine the participation of 
women within society. 
87 
The liberal tradition is based upon the notion of 
the primacy of the individual. The individual can engage in such 
practices as to enable their own advancement, also within the tenets of 
liberalism is the charge on others to properly maintain the freedom of 
others. Dietz (1992), discusses the legacy of Adam Smith. Smith 
believed liberalism was the ability of the individual to compete in the 
economic markets, which means everyone should have the ability and 
freedom to exercise such rights. 
This category of 'rights' assumes that activities 
are performed in the public sphere, linking citizenship with public life. 
Family life was considered something to be kept private, as Finch 
states, "both physically and ideologically, home and family were 
conceived of as a private place where - among other things - members 
of the family could be free from external pressures and interference" 
(1996: 196). Because family life was considered to be outside the 
public arena, then it was also outside the remrt of government 
legislation, moreover the idea of the public/private dichotomy, with the 
family being presented as naturally belonging in the private sphere had 
begun to be taken for granted, (Lister: 1993). 
Pateman argues that within the liberal tradition 
"only men count as individuals" (1990: 213), and that this state was 
again considered 'natural'. Women were supposed to belong to their 
husbands or fathers, and had hardly any redress in law. As Laurence 
states "common law did not normally acknowledge the existence of any 
woman who was not under the protection of a man" (1996: 227). 
Dietz (1992) would argue that the best way to 
change women's situations is to involve them as effective actors in the 
democratic system, getting involved with public life and becoming 
'active citizens'. But how easy would that be? Initially, as Chapter One 
88 
has shown, to become a politically active citizen meant, in this country, 
that it was necessary to own property. Laurence (1996), indicates that 
on marriage, any property the women owned immediately came under 
the jurisdiction of a husband, and on widowhood property owned by the 
husband did not automatically pass directly to the wife, but was shared 
equally between wife and children. This lack of property ownership 
meant women were not given full citizenship rights. They had no right to 
vote, and as Laurence states "women have no voice in Parliament, they 
make no laws they consent to none, they abrogate none", (1996: 227). 
When women did become active in the political 
arena, it is often as Fraser (1990) describes in the 'weak' areas as 
opposed the 'strong' areas where public policy was formed. Laurence 
describes how women's representation in the recognised areas of 
power such as the 'Guild' membership was eroded by liberal 
democracy. Liberal democracy as has been shown in Chapter One, has 
as its basic tenet, the contractual agreement between citizenship and 
the right to hold office. The 'Guild System', was a series of associations 
based on patronage and tradition. Primarily the function of the guilds 
was to regulate apprenticeships and to ensure that 'trade secrets' were 
passed on to future generations. Women could be members of the guild 
based on hereditary rights. With the inception of liberal democracy, 
there was a decline in the 'Guild System' based on tradition and an 
increase in formal office holders which meant women were 'frozen' out 
of this process. 
Early feminists hoped that universal suffrage 
could provide women with equal status to that of men. Unfortunately this 
did not prove to be the case. Women do have equal rights in so far as 
they have the ability to vote, but this has not mitigated the impact of 
social factors which may create a situation in which women cannot 
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claim their political rights - for example, lower levels of political 
involvement due to child rearing responsibilities (Phillips: 1992). 
Phillips is also concerned with why women 
were given suffrage. As Elshtain (1982) has noted, in a liberal 
democracy, citizenship was usually equated with military service, men 
were willing to go and fight for their country and therefore had 
citizenship status conferred on them. However, as Pateman (1990) and 
Phillips (1992) note, women were also providing a public service, 
providing such services as giving birth and educating and rearing 
children - services without which a society cannot survive never mind 
function. Although women's contribution to society was recognised 
accordingly by being given the suffrage, women have been given 
citizenship status in relation to their roles as wives and mothers, their 
citizenship is not therefore granted as an individual acting and reacting 
as a free agent with society, but via the third party of children and 
husbands. 
So for women there has been a long and 
arduous haul to achieve any sort of political and civil rights. At the last 
general election, women were elected to one fifth of the parliamentary 
seats, but as stated recently 
"let's not get too carried away. Britain still has fewer female 
MP's than the likes of Sweden (40 percent) and Norway (39 
percent). In the past 100 years we have had 4,500 male MP's 
and only 169 women", (The Guardian, 06.05.97, p7). 
Whilst not wishing to suggest that direct political action is useless, there 
has to be consideration given to the reasons why women are not more 
politically active. 
One reason already noted within this chapter is 
women are restricted by the lack of quality childcare. Women are still 
considered to be the main carer, also now women are moving more into 
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paid work because of financial pressures, this means a constant 
juggling act between commitment to the home and family and a 
commitment to work. This leaves very little time for political 
engagement, as Lister states, "poverty itself is a very time-consuming 
condition and even in two-parent families it is largely women's time that 
it consumes", (1993: 9). 
Lack of mobility can also play a part in keeping 
women away from organised political activity. Derounian (1993) notes 
that women living in rural areas have access to only limited resources, 
for example, the public transport service can be unreliable and 
infrequent. This hampers attempts to join groups. However, this 
argument is not necessarily restricted to women living in rural locations. 
Many suburbs are not sufficiently resourced as far as public transport is 
concerned, and women living in towns and cities are often simply too 
fearful to venture out in case of violent attacks. As Lea and Young state, 
"women in particular are very restricted in their use of public space. 
Fear of crime and harassment forces them into their homes", (1993: 
37). Again, although notice has already been drawn to this point 
already, it cannot be stressed too much that for many women, civil and 
political citizenship is 'underwritten' by social citizenship. Without social 
aspects being taken into consideration such as transport policies, 
policing policies and childcare policies, then the effects of civil and 
political citizenship are quite often negated. 
Women are therefore largely restricted to 
entering the political arena at a local level. Many community initiatives 
are started by women. Parker's (1986) study of the aftermath of the 
miner's strike shows in rich detail how women did band together to form 
a miners' support group. However, what is most revealing about his 
study is how the women did not see their actions as being political, their 
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actions were not about gaining public recognition per se, but about 
gaining public understanding for the plight of the miners. The women 
interviewed by Parker admitted they enjoyed being part of a collectivity 
fighting for a cause, and stated they felt the process made them 
question their traditional roles. However as much as the strike 
heightened the women's awareness of their own nascent political 
'careers', ultimately their actions were about anything but themselves. 
As one women revealed her reasons for forming the women's group 
were principally about social justice. She stated that, "there was a 
principle in it, the principle that we wanted to save jobs, not have our 
men put out of work and thrown on the dole. And we wanted to have a 
future for our communities where we lived and for our children" (1986: 
134). 
Greer, in a recent article in 'The Observer', 
pointed out that even when women transcend the division between 
'weak' and 'strong' politics (ie. from local to national politics), then there 
are now further divisions between back-bench MP's and front bench 
MP's. Her argument is that an unprecedented number of female MP's 
have been elected to the back bench, but media focus has been of the 
male front bench MP's rendering the female profile as invisible. She 
states that, 
"It is the crowning irony that just as women begin to appear in 
Parliament in number, back bench MP's enter deepest 
obscurity and all the attention is focused on the top males.... 
Women can expect little from their new female 
representatives, who may find their membership of the 
raucous boys' club that is Parliament a dubious privilege at 
best", (Observer, 04.05.97, p3). 
The welfare state has provided some social 
rights, but from the beginning it has always been premised upon the 
notion of male breadwinner and female homeworker. Figes (1994), 
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argues that the benefit system renders women invisible. She states that 
women are "falling through the net designed to prevent the worst forms 
of poverty. They form the majority of those claiming non-contributory 
social security and means tested benefits, which are of lower value than 
contributory benefits", (1994: 146). The social security system is biased 
against those with a blemished record of paying national insurance 
contributions, and specifically women who have taken time away from 
work to care for their children or perhaps elderly parents, as the burden 
of care still falls predominantly on women. As Rees notes, "British 
social security still marches falteringly to the beat of a Beveridgean 
social order resting on the life time earnings of male breadwinner, and 
treating many women as appendages to men" (1996: 11). 
Williams (1993), gives details about the hard 
fought battle for such benefits as 'Child Benefit', formerly known as 
'Family Allowance'. Family Allowance was a benefit paid directly to the 
mother, and was supposed to provide her with some sort of income to 
guard against the possible unpredictability of an income from her 
husband. However as Williams notes, the achievement of the family 
allowance could be described as a pyrrhic victory for women, as it is a 
way for employers to lower wages as women had another source of 
income. More damaging, however was the fact that women were still 
being seen only in relation to their mothering role. The ethos behind 
'Family Allowance', that of protecting women from possible financial 
hardship, also sought to engage women in the role of potential victims 
of male ineptitude. It propagated the idea that men were able to fend for 
themselves, but women needed to be looked after by someone, be it an 
individual husband or the state. This again seemingly reduced women's 
role to that of child-like dependency. 
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Murray (1990), argues that the welfare system 
has been liberating for women, as women no longer have to rely on 
men for money. Murray argues that there has now been a change in the 
mood of relationships. Young women have a natural propensity to 
procreate, but they can now have their children but do not have to 
accept that children go with marriage, as the state provides them with 
an income. However, in order to qualify for such benefits, the young 
women must first divulge some extremely intimate details regarding her 
private life. In a sense then, women in this case have replaced one 
patriarchal institution - marriage - for another patriarchal institution - the 
state. As one commentator notes, welfare payments are a "super-sexist 
marriage, you trade in a man for the man", (Ms, Vol 5, p50). 
As with any doctrine, liberal democracy is 
riddled with contradictions. It was stated earlier in this chapter, how the 
family was considered to be outside of the remit of government 
interference, but, with the inception of the 'Child Support Act', this 
premiss was seemingly based on a spurious foundation. The 'Child 
Support Act' came into being in 1991 (Thatcher: 1993), and from the 
beginning has been controversial. It seeks to obtain maintenance for 
children from the absent parent. The act shrouds itself in value-free 
language, discussing the obligations of the 'absent' parent and the 
'caring' parent, when really they mean the responsibility of the father for 
the mother. Since the change in legislation, even when men and 
women are not married, the law states that the man has to provide 
income to support the mother of his child. If the women refuses to give 
information about her child's father, and the CSA deem her not to have 
a sufficiently plausible excuse for not naming her child's father, then her 
benefit can be reduced. As Lister notes, "in this way, women's 
economic dependency on men that they do not even live with is being 
94 
enforced", (1993: 7). So the government is well able and willing to 
violate the privacy of the family when it suits, but still maintains that 
areas such as child care costs rest within the remit of the family and 
should not be met by the state. Such are the contradictions of liberal 
democracy. 
Evidence provided by Morris (1987) suggests 
that even when men are out of work and having to rely on state 
benefits, this does not equalise the status between the sexes. Women 
are still accepted as being the primary carer, and for men, 
unemployment is perceived as a temporary hitch to the normal 
breadwinner role. As many women cluster around the low pay section of 
the labour market they do not earn enough to support a family. If their 
unemployed husband claims income support, the bulk of the women's 
pay is deducted from her husband's benefit, therefore there is little 
incentive for a women to keep on working. As Morris notes, 
"in the current circumstances, it is only worthwhile for the wife 
of a man in long-term unemployment to seek, or remain in, 
employment herself if she can earn substantially more than 
she and husband claim in .... benefit", (198/7: 4). 
It is the case then that male unemployment can take the female 
'hostage'. 
Liberal democracy does not adequately provide 
for women in the work place. Although some women have entered the 
labour market in a position of strength, this situation does tend to be an 
exception rather than a rule. Women cluster around jobs which are still 
considered to be of secondary value, those in the service sector such 
as cleaning and low status office jobs, (See Labour Force Survey, 
Spring Quarter, 1993). Women as a percentage of the whole workforce 
now make up 49.5 percent, but still only account for a total of 2.9 
percent of the jobs considered to be the 'top jobs', (The Economist, 
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1997, p83), this is despite the plethora of rhetoric spouted on equal 
opportunities. 
Figes, (1996) argues that where discrimination 
was once quite open, the legislation on equal opportunities has merely 
spawned underhand ways of discrimination. She states that, 
"the rhetoric of equal opportunity has merely forced discrimination 
to become covert where once it was unabashed and easier to 
detect. It has also deflected attention from a host of measures in 
recent years which have made it harder, rather than easier, for a 
women to achieve economic independence and thereby equal 
citizenship", (1994: 7). 
One fundamental way in which women are not 
treated in a just manner is the payment of maternity benefits. Women's 
pregnancy is equated to male sickness, with the exception that a man 
does not have to give written notice of his impending sickness. By 
linking childbirth with sickness, it does appear that creating the next 
generation is treated with contempt, and what should be a cause for 
celebration is relegated to sympathy for the women's 'illness'. As Young 
(1990a) argues "Assimilating pregnancy into disability gives a negative 
meaning to these processes as unhealthy", (1990a: 131). 
Mackinnon (1989) believes that the problem 
with 'Equal Opportunities' legislation is that women are compared with 
men. In order to be found to have been discriminated against because 
of her sex, a women must prove that a man would be treated the same 
in those circumstances. She argues that such legislation treats "likes 
alike and unlikes a like" (1989: 225). In effect, Mackinnon argues, men 
receive entitlements because they are men, whilst women to receive 
the same entitlements have to prove that they are really the same as 
men. She states, 
"Why does maleness provide an original entitlement, 
unquestioned on the basis of its gender, while women who 
want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world men 
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have made in their image... have to show in effect that they 
are men in every relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for 
women on the basis of an accident at birth", (1989: 225). 
Cornell (1992) argues that where the concept 
of citizenship is failing in its dependency on the word 'equal'. She 
believes that equality presupposes a universal identity, a rigid 
measurement against which everything is judged. The law then has to 
use as a guide-line concepts which do not accurately reflect reality. The 
thrust of Cornell's argument, is that we should not be looking for equality 
but for equivalence. By looking for equality, women somehow have to 
'measure up' to men, for example in the case of women's maternity 
and men's illness. However, equivalence allows an acknowledgement 
of 'difference', but nevertheless provides for treatment on an equitable 
basis. 
It is important for there to be an 
acknowledgement of 'difference'. The law should have as its basic 
tenet, a respect for gender differences, be it heterosexual male/female 
or gay/lesbian differences. At present, as in the case of those claiming 
maternity benefits has shown, women have to show how their situation 
is equal to that of a males. Equivalent rights would therefore have the 
ability to make pregnancy a worthy category in its own right, without 
having to link it with the male concept of illness. By allowing equivalent 
rights it would hopefully get rid of the notion that women are being 
treated in some sort of privileged way, as some people feel that by 
accepting the idea that people are treated differently from a specified 
'norm' that this constitutes preferential treatment. 
Haraway (1992), argues that as we near the 
end of the twentieth century, then the great programme of modernity 
encompassing rights and the power of representation has simply failed. 
She is, she states, if the situation does not change fearful for the future. 
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Haraway believes that "humanity is a modernist figure; and this 
humanity has a generic face, a universal shape. Humanity's face has 
been the face of a man" (1992: 86). 
It is on this apocalyptic note, that this section 
will end. If modernity and its projects such as liberal democracy and its 
universalistic concept of citizenship have failed woman-kind, then the 
next section will consider in what ways feminism should be addressing 
the question of citizenship and 'difference'. 
Feminism: the Challenge for Citizenship 
As stated earlier in this chapter, 'women' are 
not an homogenous mass, their needs cannot be dealt with simply by 
one over-arching version of citizenship. It is perhaps the case that the 
feminist schools offer the most potent arguments against universality. 
This section will therefore consider the various debates put forward by 
feminist authors as to how citizenship should be formulated. The 
debates proffered about citizenship are very varied indeed, ranging from 
the 'radical' to the 'maternal' as well as encompassing 'difference'. 
One of the chief protagonists of the 'radical 
feminist' school, Firestone (1971), perceives the major issue with 
society to be that of oppression, with reproduction being the primary 
source of oppression. Firestone argues that women should be freed 
"from the tyranny of their reproductive biology", (1971: 233). and sees 
an increasing role in society for reproductive technology, as ultimately 
she hopes, women will be relieved of the burden of childbirth. She 
hopes that by removing childbearing from women, women will be free 
to participate in public life. Assistance with child-care costs, she argues 
is simply a sop, giving short term relief only, instead of addressing the 
more complex pressures placed upon women. 
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Firestone discusses the need for replacing 
work as it is now known. Her intention is to make society more equitable 
by making "wage labor, no longer relevant", (1971: 235). This means 
every person, adult and child alike, would be entitled to money from the 
'social pot' irrespective of their contribution. She argues that the family 
as we know it should be abolished. She deplores the 'nuclear' family, 
blaming this institution for breaking down society into selfish, 
individualistic units, arguing that marriage and the nuclear family should 
be replaced by communal living. She also challenges the notion of 
'childhood', believing this to be a modern concept, devised to strip 
children of their democratic rights. 
By removing the load of childbearing from 
women, by 'communal' living instead of 'family' living and by the 
redistribution of wealth, then "women would be identical under the law 
with men" (Firestone, 1971: 264), and children's rights would not be 
diluted by their label as 'minors', they too would have full rights. 
Firestone advocates such radical policies, because she sees the 'liberal 
tradition' of citizenship as being riddled with contradictions for women, 
she states "on the one hand, they [women] had most legal freedoms, 
the literal assurance that they were considered full political citizens of 
society - and yet they had no power.", (1971: 34). 
The 'radical liberal' school of feminism, 
represented here by Eisenstein (1981) argues "while the liberal 
underpinnings of feminist theory are essential to feminism, the 
patriarchal underpinnings of liberal theory are also indispensable to 
liberalism", (Eisenstein, 1981: 5). She likewise, sees motherhood as 
being problematic. Women, because their distinguishing feature is their 
ability to give birth, have been excluded consistently from any other role 
within society. Family life and marriage have been used to control 
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women, and even when women have entered the arena of work, they 
are still in a vulnerable position, being paid less than their male 
counterparts, and being involved in a lower calibre of work. However, 
she takes a very different stand to Firestone. 
Eisenstein argues that any feminist discourse 
must take into account the needs of the 'working mother1, where there is 
a double demand on her, her role within the capitalist market, and her 
role within the patriarchal institution of the family. She further argues 
that the state, because it is a patriarchal institution, consistently reduces 
women to their biological condition of child-bearer, and will not 
recognise that in fact, motherhood is a politically constructed category. 
Therefore the State, has locked women into the role of mother and has 
denied any other public role. Eisenstein believes that whilst the law 
should be used to challenge behaviour this is not enough. She believes 
that there is a difference between "formal 'rights' reform and reforms of 
'substance", (1981: 232). Essentially she is arguing that 'rights reforms' 
are more of a symbolic importance to women than of 'real life' changing 
importance, and that the inequalities existing within society are not 
simply because of how women are identified within society, but because 
of the structural underpinnings of society, which work to keep women 
out of positions of power. The way forward for Eisenstein then, is not 
simply to discuss the matter and bring in laws to try and strengthen 
women's positions within society, but that women should be involved in 
direct action. She states that "At this stage of struggle, when women's 
equality is not left to theory but fought for in practice, women will be 
involved in the revolutionary process of struggling for their liberation", 
(1981: 234/235). 
So to sum up before moving the debate further. 
The family and motherhood have come under criticism from Firestone 
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and Eisenstein. Their challenge for citizenship is radical, and based on 
equality with men. Firestone eventually wants to see childbearing dealt 
with by new reproductive technology, and for every person irrespective 
of whether they are man, woman or child to have equal rights, and to 
have equal access to funds irrespective of their contribution to such a 
fund. Eisenstein, is less radical than Firestone, though she does 
challenge the 'family', and believes that the family is a source of 
patriarchal power. Eisenstein not only wants equal status with men, 
through the process of equal opportunities legislation, she wants the 
whole structure of society to be challenged. 
The 'radical' schools of feminism have at times 
seemingly placed all the blame for women's lack of status and power on 
the family and childrearing. Lovenduski and Randall (1993), describe in 
detail how the family and motherhood are often scorned and paraded as 
tools of the patriarchal power system, and that being a member of a 
'traditional' family entailed a life of drudgery and misery. Charges levied 
against the family were that, 
"it helps to perpetuate social inequalities by facilitating the 
transmission of maternal and cultural advantages. It 
encourages individualism by focusing loyalty on the family unit 
rather than on a wider collective: it permits all kinds of physic/ 
abuse of the weaker family members by the strongerSjnde"r 
cover of privacy: and finally it embodies and maintains the 
sexual division of labour", (1993: 271/272). 
Of motherhood itself, "Being a mother meant losing control -
specifically, of the conception, of the birth, and of the children's 
upbringing, but, in a broader sense, of oneself and of one's own life", 
(1993: 278). These are arguably hefty charges levelled at family life and 
motherhood, and it will be argued that such claims are actually 
undermining women by not allowing them any sort of sense of agency 
or choice in making a decision to- be either a mother or a wife. The 
argument will now continue by examining what has been coined as 
'maternal feminism', to see what form citizenship should take for this 
group. 
Radical feminism is not without its critics. 
There are some who believe that feminism should be wary of attempts 
to dismantle women's roles within the family arguing that it is not 
necessarily advantageous to constantly strive for women's participation 
in the public world of men (Elshtain: 1982). Elshtain maintains that the 
debates surrounding citizenship and women have within the feminist 
perspective, historically taken the view that women have suffered 
because they have not been allowed into the arena of male power and 
authority, women have not been allowed a public persona. She argues 
that women should strive for an identity of their own, one that has no 
need to align itself with "overweening state power and public identity in 
its terms" f /1982: 46/47). Elshtain proposes that instead of hankering 
"v._. 
constantly after inclusion in the public domain of political life - which she 
argues places very little value on life anyway - women should start to 
acknowledge that their greatest virtue can be that they are capable of 
literally bringing forth life, they can give birth. She maintains that the 
argument pertaining to the public-private divide is too simplistic and fails 
to take into account the richness of women's lives. 
Family and motherhood - the private domain -
should take primacy over the public domain. Family life and motherhood 
form a morally superior existence, and it is ultimately the case that 
family life will always take precedence because we are family minded 
creatures - that includes both men and women. This is of course in 
total contrast to the citizenship promulgated by Aristotle. As discussed 
in Chapter one, Aristotelian citizenship was based on the notion of man 
being a political animal. Elshtain hopes to achieve a feminist discourse 
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which did not negate the vibrancy of women's lives, and accepted that 
citizenship should not be based simply on the contractual agreement 
between the individual and the state. By rejecting the idea of 
individualism, and imbibing the values consistently found within a 
mothering relationship, then ultimately she hopes, the civic bond would 
be strengthened. 
Advancing this argument, Ruddick (1983) 
believes that by nature women avoid anything that purports to be 'clear 
cut', and have a natural abhorrence of anything which is rigid and 
closed. Women as mothers have a responsibility to bring up children to 
be virtuous, commenting that, "They want the child they produce to be a 
person whom they themselves, and those closest to them, can 
appreciate", (1983: 220). However, she further states that the act of 
socialisation of children occurs in a society where women have less 
power than men. The socialisation process is therefore highjacked from 
its original position of rearing a child who can be 'appreciated', to 
rearing a child contingent on the practices of society, which regards 
male values as being of greater significance than female values. For 
Ruddick, maternal thought is a "social category", (1983: 225), and as 
such men can also find themselves capable of 'maternal thought', as 
they too can find themselves being in the position of a primary carer. 
Ruddick argues that there is a need for social change, men should be 
willing to yield power and accept a more equitable role in caring for 
children. The experience of relinquishing public power for a heightened 
role in private might make men more sympathetic and willing to change 
the inequalities experienced within the public sphere. Ruddick hopes 
that by raising men's awareness surrounding the problems experienced 
by women such as the lack of childcare facilities, then they would argue 
for reform. 
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Conversely, many feminists have actually 
campaigned to be included in the military (Ruddick: 1990) . The 
inclusion of women in the military, is supposed to mean that they have 
absolute equality with men. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that 
citizenship was given as a status to men because they were willing to 
go to war for their country. By engaging in armed forces, many women 
have argued that they are now also willing to go to war. As Ruddick 
states, "many feminists believe that it is a part of citizenship in a 
democratic society to assume the privileges and burdens a military 
state imposed on its citizens", (1990:235). To be willing to engage in 
combat, means women are satisfying the tenets of civic duty. 
However, Ruddick challenges the merits of 
such action, she abhors the fact that men and women are trained to kill, 
sometimes for a cause that they neither support nor understand. She 
believes that women do enter into hostilities, but only when the threat is 
tangible, something which threatens them or their children. What is 
consistently ignored in time of war, is that war is not waged only on a 
battlefield - especially in today's climate when wars tend to take place 
within states rather than between states. As Ruddick notes, many 
women do get sucked into the melee. She states that, 
"But in war 'homes' have always been battlefields; now 
'battlefields' can be brought home by soldiers high in the sky 
or behind computers miles away. It may be the soldier who is 
somewhere else, on the other side of the missile or bomb, 
when cities burn, the food rots, and the children sicken and 
die", (1990: 251). 
In summary, Phillips (1993), further discusses 
Elshtain and Ruddick, and draws attention to how these authors have 
opened up further discussion on how the public world can be tempered 
with the compassion found in the private world of women. By 
incorporating the values held in the private sphere, especially the bond 
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between a mother and her child, where generally mothers do have their 
child's interest at heart, it is hoped will lead to a kinder, gentler form of 
public life. Citizenship for Elshtain and Ruddick is about realising that 
the liberal view has harboured a selfish individualism, whereas their 
'brand' of feminism - 'maternal feminism' is about caring and collectivity. 
As Phillips states, 
"Both these writers had turned to women's experience as 
mothers as an antidote to a male metaphysics, and Elshtain in 
particular saw mothering as the basis for a new politics of 
compassion that would reconstruct the political sphere", 
(1993: 82). 
Carter 1992) also calls into question the 
veracity of the claim that family life is oppressive and an unfulfilling 
experience for women. She challenges calls that have been made for 
the dissolution of the family. As mentioned earlier some argue that 
family life should not be about the 'nuclear' style of family, but that 
children should be brought up by adults unrelated to the child, the notion 
is that your family should be determined by choice, (Firestone: 1971). 
However as Carter notes this type of communal living was never really 
sustained for any length of time, because ultimately family life and 
marriage, 
"in modern society... is a sphere of privacy, affection and 
intimacy; and in the home women and men can find a degree 
of dignity and self-fulfilment which may be denied to them at 
work and by society as a whole... The ideal of love and 
constancy between husband and wife is a genuinely attractive 
ideal, and not simply a myth to subjugate women", (1992: 
181). 
By contrast, Dietz (1985), is vehement in her 
rejection of 'maternal feminism', because "it harbours some serious 
problems for feminist political discourse and democratic political action" 
(1985: 20). Her criticism of 'maternal feminism' is that it is inherently 
conservative in its approach, with its emphasis on tradition and family. 
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Challenging the over romantic notion of family life, she believes that 
further investigations about the usefulness and integrity of family life 
should be carried out before accepting the family as a panacea for the 
all the ills in society. 
It is misleading, Dietz argues, to assume that 
the private sphere is comfortable and secure whilst the public sphere is 
harsh and uncaring. Arguably, in order to have any bearing on family 
life, women must begin to enter the political arena. Policy relating to the 
family is not generally made in private, it is made through political 
debate, which in turn impacts onto the private. She states that, 
"family life and privacy, as well as social practices and 
economic issues, are matters of political decisions making. 
Family practices, control over family property, the rights of 
children, the nature of schooling and child labour laws, 
benefits for single mothers, the regulation of birth control - all 
of these things, whether we like it or not, are potentially open 
to political control and may be politically determined", (1985: 
27). 
Dietz (1992) places value on participatory 
democracy. She rejects the notion that all politics can be reduced to 
"the arrogant, male, public realm", (1992: 75). Democracy is 
empowering, it does not reduce people to a single identity of mother or 
an individual with certain rights, democracy is about the ability to share 
in the public world, democracy means that we can interact with people 
in an equal relationship, that of citizen, untainted by other identities we 
may hold. Dietz is uncomfortable with the notion of maternal feminism 
because it relies on the superiority of motherhood. For Dietz, 
democracy is about sharing concerns and developing mutual respect, 
and that no person's point of view is more valid than the next. She has 
no time for the sentimentality of the argument of developing loving 
bonds between citizens. Citizens she argues "are not intimately, but 
politically involved with each other",(1985: 31). Intimacy must remain 
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within the private realm, as the word suggests it is a product of privacy, 
and should not be held up for public - and therefore - political scrutiny. 
Women should be challenging society, and 
should start to exercise their rights as citizens in the political world. As 
stated earlier, Dietz is an advocate of participatory democracy, where 
women do get involved in making speeches and organising political 
debates. Recognising the absolute pivotal role of politics in effecting 
change, she states that "My basic point is a straightforward one: for a 
vision of citizenship, feminists should turn to the virtues, relations and 
practices that are expressly political and, more exactly, participatory and 
democratic", (1992:75). 
Also attesting to the power of participatory 
democracy for women is Summers (1991). She is adamant that women 
must be involved with the political process to ensure that they are not 
pushed into the background, or worse still into the role of the "passive 
client", (1991: 40). Summers argues the need for citizenship dialogue 
went hand-in-hand with the onset of capitalism, excepting that once the 
notion of citizenship had been introduced, it began to challenge the very 
bed-rock of capitalism by demanding liberty and equality. She maintains 
that the recent forays into citizenship, may, for women bring about 
similar results. Certainly debates have abounded within the feminist 
camp about how to bring about a more equitable society. She states 
that, 
"In other words, just as the concept of the 'free and equal 
individual' was used to create the conditions necessary for the 
development of capitalism but then began to challenge the 
very foundations of the system which had created it by 
encouraging expectations of 'real' equality and freedom, so 
might the 'active citizen' turn against its creator by 
encouraging people to demand the concrete rights behind the 
rhetorical sham", (1991: 40). 
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Disagreeing in part with Dietz, Young (1990) 
maintains that no one should lose their identity, and people should 
engage with politics as part of a group, because generally groups have 
a shared history and shared interests, and can articulate needs more 
effectively. However, Young agrees with Dietz on the importance of 
participating in politics. She believes that there needs to be a re-
appraisal of the prevailing system for group participation in the political 
sphere. Like Phillips (1993), she has little faith in the process of 
consociationalism, arguing that it does not follow the tenets of 
democracy. Young also argues that it is not merely women who require 
such representation, discrimination also occurs against groups such as 
gays and lesbians, blacks and disabled people. She advocates that all 
people should have access to community forums or assemblies, and 
everyone should have the chance to voice their opinion and participate 
in the general discussions. Young differentiates between, what she 
describes as the "heterogeneous public" and "interest group pluralism", 
(1990: 128), for her the 'heterogeneous public' is a group of people that 
can substantiate their claim that they are oppressed, also this group is 
not defined by some single interest, as is the case of for example the 
'gun club'. This differentiation is important, the interest group, is as the 
name implies, only interested in furthering its own end. Young believes 
such interest groups will attempt to stifle any debate in order to promote 
their own agenda, and does not have to justify its actions, as it is not 
acting in the interests of social justice, merely group advancement. 
In order to have a truly equal society, Young 
believes that we must begin to give "special rights for oppressed or 
disadvantaged groups", (1990: 131). Universality does not take into 
account the varying needs of differing groups. She argues that the need 
exists because at present the notion of equal treatment presupposes 
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that there is a neutral measurement of equality. Yet in society, groups 
are not equal, some are oppressed and discriminated against, so there 
is no such thing at present as a neutral measure of equality, differences 
between groups should be considered. She believes that society should 
consider ways in which to overcome this problem, such as the 
implementation of'Affirmative Action' programmes, and even something 
as simple as producing government information literature in other 
languages to take into account the needs of those who may not speak 
the dominant language of the country. 
Whist acknowledging that 'difference' has to be 
considered and that feminism can no longer purport to speak for a 
'sisterhood', Barrett (1987) is concerned by the concept of 'difference'. 
She argues that difference can indeed be used to marginalise groups. 
'Difference' presupposes choice, where as a free agent we choose our 
own 'difference', instead of perceiving 'difference' to be a category 
chosen for us in order to exclude. She states "it presupposes a notion of 
human subject, seen as an active and effective social and political 
agent, that has been extensively criticised in much recent theory", 
(1987: 33). 
Gordon (1991), is also concerned with the 
notion of the 'politics of difference'. She argues that by concerning 
ourselves with difference, we are not looking at the deeper problem of 
inequality. Instead of scrutinising the power relationships between 
groups the 'politics of difference' looks simply at the differences. She 
states "From this perspective it is a step backward to think about the 
experiences of minority and white women as merely different", 
(1991:106). 'Difference' still carries with it the stigma of the 'other', and 
can therefore be used to exclude. She uses as an example, how white 
feminists, by using 'difference' felt unable to cover minority interests in 
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their work, on the grounds that they, because they were not in the 
minority group, could not begin to comprehend their experiences of life. 
Taken to its ultimate conclusion, Gordon argues that this reasoning 
could be applied in most situations, and leads to a lack of understanding 
of others, she states " 'difference' comes full circle to justify 
introspective scholarship and the reproduction of racist ignorance" 
(1991:107). 
Aligning herself with Gordon, Benhabib (1992), 
is concerned that the notion of universalism has been discredited 
unfairly. She defends the concept of universality against 'difference', 
and is worried that the politics of 'difference' will be used to cloud the 
issue between receiving equal treatment and that of being treated as 
the 'other'. However Benhabib does challenge the 'accepted' version of 
universality. She states that, 
"my purpose is to develop a universalistic moral theory that 
defines the 'moral point of view' in light of the reversibility of 
perspectives and an 'enlarged mentality'. Such a moral theory 
allows us to recognize the dignity of the generalized other 
through an acknowledgement of the moral identity of the 
concrete other" (1992: 164). 
To refresh the reader before drawing to a 
conclusion. This section began by examining the work of the radical 
feminist, Shulamith Firestone. Firestone's discussion centred around 
women' no longer being defined by their roles as mother and wife. 
Firestone believed reproductive technology will eventually be so 
advanced that as a race, humans will be able to reproduce themselves 
without the need for women to give birth. This means everyone will be 
free to choose where they live and with whom. She argues that children 
should be rights bearers and not as at present be the responsibility of 
anyone be it parent or guardian. She also advocates that there is a 
need for work to be restructured, and that people should be able to 
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draw an income from a 'social pot' irrespective of if they have 
contributed. 
Eisenstein, is described as a radical liberal 
feminist. She also abhors, what she considers to be the patriarchal 
institution of the family, which she believes ties women to a 'double 
shift'. Eisenstein wants a more inclusive set of social rights, this means 
the government being more committed to issues affecting women such 
as child care arrangement. She believes that unless the structure of 
society is reformed radically then any attempts to legislate for equality 
will be mere rhetoric. 
Elshtain and Ruddick, have been described as 
'maternal feminists'. Elshtain argues that the private sphere is morally 
superior to the public sphere, and reasons that women should not try to 
define themselves in relation to the male dominated public sphere, but 
should attempt to build their own identity based on the caring nature of 
mothers. It is her contention that if the mother-child relationship was 
projected onto society in general then the bond of civil society will be 
strengthened. 
Ruddick believes that men can and should be 
involved in 'maternalism', that not all men have a propensity for war-
mongering. She argues that originally citizenship was a conferred status 
on men because they went to war for their countries, Ruddick argues, 
that as many wars are now civil wars, then women are involved in the 
process of war, and therefore there should be a re-examination of the 
notion of citizenship. 
Dietz, rejects maternal feminism on the basis 
that it is inherently conservative. She challenges the notion of the 
security of the private space of the family, for her the private sphere is 
political, as policy made regarding family life automatically has 
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ramifications for the family. She believes that women should be involved 
in the democratic process, as this means that citizenship will become a 
truly egalitarian way of life, independent of a person's status in for 
example the field of employment. 
Young however challenges Dietz, whilst 
agreeing that people should become involved with the democratic 
process, they should do so as part of a group. She believes that society 
should start to recognise a 'politics of difference' where oppressed 
groups are given special rights in order to participate in public life. 
However, Barrett, Gordon and Benhabib are 
wary of promoting difference. They believe that to concentrate on 
'difference', is to promote a sense of the 'other', which can be construed 
as a category of exclusion. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has brought to the reader's 
attention the profusion of debates from feminist authors regarding 
citizenship and feminism. There are so many women writing about how 
'citizenship' as a universal concept has seemingly failed women, and 
how 'citizenship' should be constructed for the future, that a decision 
had to be made about who to discuss and who to leave out. On the 
basis of this information, this thesis does not pretend to be the definitive 
piece of work regarding women and citizenship. The intention is to draw 
the readers attention to the fact that citizenship, whilst purporting to be 
neutral is indeed far from being so. 
Whilst Firestone's style of feminism may 
appeal to some, it fails to understand that some women might actually 
like to be a wife and mother. Her demands for communal living are also 
called into question, as mentioned earlier, communal living did have a 
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short and inauspicious life. Her idea of people receiving an income 
without having to contribute must be queried, does she mean that 
people who cannot work will receive money or does she mean anybody 
can receive money? If it is the latter rather than the former, then who 
will finance this, she did mention a redistribution of income, but once 
that income has been redistributed then where will continuing funds 
come from? She also proposes that children should be accorded full 
citizenship rights, without the need for any one person to take 
responsibility for them . This is a most naive proposition. How can a 
child who may be too young to speak, articulate its needs? She 
presupposes that the whole of society will act in a way that does not 
exploit, but unfortunately whilst not wishing to be pessimistic about the 
nature of humanity, this is not the case, we do exploit, we do cheat, we 
do lie and we do commit heinous acts of violence for pleasure. 
Therefore children do need someone who will take responsibility for 
them, for their own protection. 
Whilst Elshtain and Ruddick are laudable in 
their contempt of the 'public' insofar as the 'public' does at times 
encompass a selfish individualism, their theory of 'maternal feminism' is 
a highly romanticised notion of mothering and the family. Not all 
mothers have their child's best interests at heart, and not all families are 
safe and secure. Also the relationships operating within the family and 
between a mother and child are presumably based on the bond of love. 
Love is a private emotion, can love really form the basis of civil society? 
As shown, the use of emotion as a basis for forming citizenship is 
inevitably flawed. Citizenship needs to be something outside of the remit 
of emotion. Citizenship is ultimately a public status and as such 
needs to be based on egalitarianism, where, personal antipathies will 
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not cloud judgement, and where individuals can be treated according to 
publicly agreed rules of fairness and justice. 
Eisenstein has seemingly winkled out the root 
of the problem, and that is that no matter how much legislation is 
passed unless there is a consideration of the power base then any 
attempts at trying to gain an equal say for women will be pointless. 
Lister (1990 & 1993) concurs, she argues that unless the public-private 
dichotomy is challenged then nothing will change. Lister envisages that 
women will have to fight for change, she states "Citizenship rights are 
not going to be handed down to women on a plate. They are going have 
to be fought for", (1993: 13). 
Dietz and Young, whilst disagreeing on certain 
issues already discussed in this chapter, both agree that women should 
enter the public domain, whether as Dietz believes as individuals or as 
Young would argue as part of a group. Dietz proposes that women 
should become involved in the political realm, they should claim what is 
theirs by right, but seldom comes to fruition in practice, they should 
begin to exercise their rights as citizens to become involved in the 
public realm. 
However, women have to be careful not to be 
too hasty. As mentioned earlier, Eisenstein remarks on the dissonance 
between what is said in law and what is actually practiced in reality, and 
there is undoubtedly truth in her remark. But to say legislation will not 
work and that it is merely paying lip-service to the notion of equal 
citizenship is negating the power of law. Young (1990) believes that the 
policy of 'affirmative action', should be considered in order to take into 
account the imbalances prevalent within society. 
'Affirmative action' policies should be written 
into law. Those in positions of power should be made to recognise that 
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there is a need to give special dispensation to minority groups. Policy 
such as this cannot be left to voluntary codes of practice, it needs to be 
enshrined into law, for two reasons. The first is obvious, anyone not 
adhering to the law can be prosecuted, but second, it sends out signals 
that oppression and discrimination will not be tolerated. Critics will point 
out that there is much equal opportunities policy in operation at present 
which is flouted, the answer to this is that where it is flouted, people 
must be prepared to challenge this situation. Another criticism levelled 
at 'affirmative action' will be that minority groups will be, for example, 
given jobs simply because they are a member of a minority group and 
not because they merit the job. The answer to this must be 'so what', if 
for example we look at British society, then how many men have got 
into the positions of power by flashing the 'old school tie'? Can it really 
be said that they were recruited or promoted purely on merit? 
Most of the arguments contained within this 
section are equally applicable to men. It is nonsense to suggest that 
every male has more chances in life than every female, subscribing to 
the theory that 'all men are bastards', is not a very constructive 
argument. Power is held by some men, and it is their power which 
should be challenged. Also by increasing social rights for men as well 
as women ultimately means men and women can contribute equally to 
society. For example, the right to paternal leave would ease the 
women's burden whilst probably increasing man's satisfaction with his 
home life, after all why should the pleasure of nurturing a child be 
considered solely for women? Women would then have more time to 
spend in public pursuits, whilst men would be more engaged in private 
pursuits, and perhaps this situation would presage a greater 
understanding of the roles ascribed to people by merit of gender by 
society. 
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Ultimately this chapter has shown that political 
and civil rights are negated if social rights are missing or flawed. To 
create a more equitable society means that there has to be an 
emphasis on social citizenship, and this does mean, despite warnings 
from Gordon, Barrett and Benhabib, that difference must be considered. 
Universal concepts of citizenship do not take into account the richness 
and diversity of people's lives. 
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CooeSysioin) 
Cife®nship: a moat5°facetedl c o n c e p t ? 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis has 
challenged the notion that citizenship can be understood as a single 
integrated idea, of which attempts to 'universalise' social and political 
rights are a foremost example. It has been primarily a journey 
examining the facets of citizenship beginning with the Utopian ideal of 
Aristotle and ending with some sign-posts as to how citizenship may be 
understood in the future, which is likely to include the need to 
encompass 'difference'. 
One aspect of this exploration has been 
concerned with the nation-state. The nation-state whilst certainly in a 
weakened position remains an important means of ensuring citizenship 
rights. Arguably it is the case, that whilst globalisation has been a 
fragmenting force, the nation-state has continued to provide a source of 
identity. It appears at times that the more the pressures associated with 
globalisation seem to eradicate traditional social, economic and political 
boundaries, the more individuals cling on to the 'boundaries' of identity, 
particularly, perhaps, those that provide a sense of affiliation on 
'membership'. Nevertheless, the nation-state must guard against 
becoming too insular. Patriotism is healthy, nationalism is not. States 
can be made up of varying nations and it seems unfeasible to declare 
that the particularisms of language and culture will be swept away and 
replaced by an over-arching identity. Likewise, citizenship must begin to 
encompass the notion of 'difference'. The 'particular* in order to survive 
must be bolstered by the social, legal and political rights of citizenship. 
Citizenship must be an inclusive, but not an 
'assimilative' project. The notion of 'difference' has to be a 
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consideration. This does not necessarily mean that the whole political 
process is high-jacked by interest groups determined on getting their 
'difference' recognised at the expense of other 'difference' groups. 
There is a fear that by encompassing difference then the whole 
citizenship project will be called into question. Some would argue that 
citizenship must remain a universal concept guaranteeing equality 
before the law. However universality fails to take into consideration the 
plurality of modern life. The world is not made up of 'stand-alone' 
societies, and traditional modes of existence are increasingly being 
called into question. There now has to be some forum for discussing 
how previously excluded groups such as Aborigines and Black 
Americans - and women - can become part of the democratic process. 
That said this does not mean that they have to forsake their cultures, 
the analogy of the 'melting-pot' is anachronistic, particular needs have 
to be satisfied and not eroded. Giddens' (1996) 'dialogic democracy' 
may be worthy of consideration. There needs to be an inclusive 
'mechanism' in public discussion about the legal rules and methods of 
representation , as citizenship clearly operates on many dimensions. 
Citizenship as now proposed within Liberal 
democracies, is not addressing the interests of certain sectors of 
society, for example, women. The adherence to a universal concept of 
citizenship means that a rigid standard has been set in place, and for 
women to 'measure up' to that standard they must be judged, not in the 
context of their own needs, but to have their needs compared to those 
of men. This means that women are extended citizenship rights as 
'second-rate' men. Therefore the notion of 'difference' must be 
considered, and within this context even the notion of different 
'differences' must be explored. However, 'difference' is not only 
118 
gendered, 'difference' operates on other axis too, such as race, age and 
disability. 
A further problem with the notion of liberal 
democracy is that it deems 'citizenship' to be a legal concept only, 
therefore negating the richness of civic life. However, one must be 
aware of the problems that will be encountered by simply attempting to 
replace liberalism with communitarianism and their argument of the 
'common-good'. Ultimately citizenship is a multi-faceted concept and as 
such, should not be simply about finding the common ground. Within 
the current meaning of citizenship as a majoritarian system, 
'differences' were either ignored or efforts were made to assimilate 
those with differing needs into the mainstream. This ignored the 
subtleties of human life. Whilst accepting the fears of some that the 
politics of difference may encourage either a victim mentality or 
provoke outbreaks of violence, surely there is a counter-argument for 
this. It is often the case when needs are ignored or people are not 
encouraged to communicate that tensions build up. More than anything 
else, people will probably fight over their right to be heard and included 
in the political process. 
Being multi-faceted, citizenship, is effectively 
a prism reflecting different forms of inclusion and belonging which are 
not necessarily commensurate but which are equally valid and therefore 
need to be taken into account. Time and time again, we see a false 
dichotomy at play, that of public -v- private. As individuals, we cannot 
disassociate our actions from society at large. As Young implies, what 
we do and say in private has ramifications for what is done and said in 
public, any lines drawn around our actions, in an attempt to demarcate 
the 'public' from the 'private' sphere must be arbitrary. The whole notion 
of citizenship must consequently remain in a constant state of flux. 
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Ultimately the citizenship project must be about flexibility, open to 
challenge and modification as and when necessary. 
Of course, the suggestion here is not that 
change will happen overnight - it will not. The notion of citizenship 
being a universal concept does still continue to be a very powerful idea, 
but if 'difference' is to be recognised it will be by rejecting the 
supremacy of universalism and engaging with pluralism. Multi-faceted 
problems need multi-faceted answers. 
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